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[M]ankind prefers to see gestures rather than to hear reasons.
FriedrichNietzsche'

I. PRELUDE

Gay men and lesbians, sexual nonconformists,' are tolerable and tolerated in American society and under American law only if they keep their
identities submerged and participate in their own public obliteration The
sexual-conduct taboos of dominant culture mark sexual intercourse other
than heterosexual vaginal intercourse within a monogamous marriage as a
breach of a basic, clear, and immutable Divine commandment.4 "For gays,

1. FRIEDRICH NIETzsCHE, THE ANTICHRIST ch. 54 (1888), reprinted in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCtE 568, 639 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1968).
2. Terminology has become a touchy subject in recent years, and rightly so. Janet Halley has
noted that "[r]ecent academic writing on homosexuality almost always begins with an acknowledgment
that the words we use to describe same-sex love inevitably reflect and shape our political commitments on this volatile subject. This article can be no exception." Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the
Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915,
916 n.5 (1989); see also Jeffrey G. Sherman, Speaking Its Name: Sexual Orientation and the Pursuit
of Academic Diversity, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 121, 122 (1992) (noting that the selection of terminology is
a potentially tedious exercise). I use the term "sexual nonconformists" in an attempt to find a relatively
neutral term (neutral, if only because rarely used) for other, more problematical, terms: gay, lesbian,
homosexual, and bisexual (used either as an adjective or a noun). The term is meant to connote another species of nonconformists, modem day American Protestants, whose forebearers were originally
viewed as heretics by the dominant European Catholic majority, and despised and suppressed as such,
and who frequently came to this country in search of the right to affirm their religious identity in
public.
3. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 587-91 (1992)
(describing the phenomenon of "flouting," which from the perspective of heterosexual society means
being seen or heard as anything other than a neutered individual); Randy Von Beitel, The
Criminalization of Private Homosexual Acts: A Jurisprudential Case Study of a Decision by the Texas
Bar Penal Code Revision Committee, 6 HuM. RTs. 23, 44-45 (1976) (describing the fear of flouting by
gay men and lesbians as a source of the reticence of Texas lawmakers to decriminalize sodomy in the
1970s). I note, at the outset, that it is not the purpose of this article to engage in victim talk, which, as
Martha Minow recently suggested, "blurs evaluations of degrees of harm and degrees of responsibility
in both the lives of individuals and the larger structures of society." Martha Minow, Surviving Victim
Talk, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1411, 1413 (1993).
4. See Leviticus 18:22 ("Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind; it is an
abomination."); Leviticus 20:13 ("And if a man lie with mankind, as with womankind, both of them
have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them."). It
is interesting to note that Leviticus also enjoins, on pain of death, a variety of other actions, all of
which modem religious Christians tend to ignore. For example, working on the Sabbath, Leviticus
23:30, and cursing your parents, Leviticus 20:9, are both capital offenses. Some of these offenses remain of interest to American lawmakers. For an interesting discussion on this point, see generally MEL
WHITE, STRANGER AT THE GATE (1994) (attempting a Christian reinterpretation of Biblical imperatives
from a modem perspective).
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the taboos mark them as unspeakably gross and disgusting-like shit."5
As far as the dominant culture is concerned, at least in its popular manifestation:
A major problem exists between heterosexuals and homosexuals.
However, a solution is at hand. Science has come to the rescue
once again. The discovery that the DNA of homosexuals is different than normal DNA is a major breakthrough. This will allow
expectant women to have a DNA test performed on their unborn
baby. If the results show the DNA pattern of a homosexual, she

can simply abort the abnormal child.6

"Thatseems to be the lesson of twenty-five years of liberal toleration.
That is what continues to stymie the promise of a positive public existence
for sexual nonconformists which appeared so attainable in the aftermath of
the June 1969 police raid on the Stonewall Bar in New York City. 7 That

is our inheritance from those modem sources of western sexual "liberation
theology," at least as they touch directly on the criminal law -the

5. RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 100 (1988).
6. Chuck Brinson, Draw the Line, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 2, 1993, at News-12 (letter to the Editor); accord William A. Henry Il, Born Gay?-Studies of Family Trees and DNA Make the Case That
Male Homosexuality Is in the Genes, TIME, July 26, 1993, at 36, 39 (quoting "Thomas Stoddard, director of the Campaign for Military Service: 'One can imagine 1he science of the future manipulating
information of this kind to reduce the number of gay people being born.' ").
7. The raid on the Stonewall Bar and the ensuing riot mark the birth event of the modern gay
and lesbian movement, the anniversary of which is now celebrated as Gay Pride Day. DENNIS
ALTMAN, THE HOMOSEXUAUZATION OF AMERICA 113 (1982).
8. The effect, obviously, is not limited to the criminal law, but pervades all aspects of the legal
rights of the "immoral." An examination of these effects lies outside the scope of this article. For a
discussion of these issues in other contexts, see, e.g., Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation

and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1554-1670 (1989). Those issues include employment, see
Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 535 P.2d 804, 805 (Wash. 1975) (firing of a gay teacher on
grounds of immorality upheld), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); marriage, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993) (discussing the constitutionality of suppressing nontraditional marriages);
adoption, see FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1993) (prohibiting gay men and lesbians from adopting); child
custody (even of one's own children), see Elizabeth Kastor, The Battle for the Boy in the Middle;
Little Tyler's Mom Is a Lesbian, so Grandma Got to Take Him Away, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1993, at

CI (reporting that a judge determined the mother's life with her lover was immoral and illegal and on
that basis awarded custody of her son to the grandmother); Mother's Lesbianism Cited as She Loses
Custody Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1993, at B14 (reporting that the custody of two children was
awarded to the father because "their mother's lesbian lifestyle was bad for [the youngsters]," even
though the mother had had custody of the children since the 1988 divorce); immigration, see Boutilier
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 120-25 (1967) (holding that Congress, in adopting the Immigration and Naturalization Act, intended to exclude homosexuals from admission under
the category "psychopathic personality"); insurance, see, e.g., Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. luculano,
AIDS and Insurance: The Rationalefor AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1806 (1987)
(contending that laws intended to ensure fair protection of AIDS victims are endangering the financial
stability of insurance carriers); and housing, see Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1160
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Wolfenden Report,9 and the Model Penal Code.' °
Unfortunately for the beneficiaries of these methodologies of "liberation," the Wolfenden Report and Model Penal Code are themselves instruments of perversion." They provide an excellent example of the manner
in which heterosexual liberal discourse can, by invoking such high concepts as toleration, conceal multiple forms of subjugation of sexual nonconformists. I use these pillars of liberal toleration to examine a subtext of
modem toleration-that decriminalization requires those whose conduct is
thus liberated to continue to act as if decriminalization never occurred. As
long as sexual nonconformists continue to act as if they are engaging in
criminal acts-furtively, secretly, always in fear of detection-their conduct will not be subject to criminal penalty. The perversity of this liberation is evident when one considers that, at this point, a reader might be
tempted to dismiss the argument that all acts of sexual nonconformity

(Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (holding there was no right to rent in violation of fornication statute); State v.
French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 23 (Minn. 1990) (refusing to rent to an unmarried couple did not violate law);
Matthew J. Smith, The Wages of Living in Sin: Discrimination in Housing Against Unmarried Couples, 25 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 1055, 1065-68 (1992).
9. COMMIrrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT

(Authorized Am. ed., Stein & Day 1963) (1957) [hereinafter THE WOLFENDEN REPORT]. The Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution was created on August 24, 1954 by an act of Parliament
to consider the law and practice relating to homosexual offenses, prostitution, and solicitation for immoral purposes. Id. para. 1. Its report to the British Parliament, dated August 12, 1957, recommended
that private consensual homosexual conduct, but not the crime of gross indecency between males, be
decriminalized. Id. para. 355. Interestingly, their recommendations were largely rejected by British
lawmakers for nearly a decade. For a discussion of the Wolfenden Report, and its effects, see J.E. Hall
Williams, Sex Offenses: The British Experience, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 334, 347-58 (1960).
10. The Model Penal Code is a project of the American Law Institute (ALl), an organization
devoted to the reformulation and modernization of law. The ALl develops uniform codes representing
their view of the best approach to a particular body of law. It is then hoped that state legislatures use
the laws developed by the model rules in reformulating their own law. The drafting of the Model
Penal Code was commenced in 1952. The proposed official draft of the Model Penal Code was adopted on May 4, 1962. The revision of the Commentaries began in 1976. See MODEL PENAL CODE
(1980). Unless otherwise noted, I use the Model Penal Code comments as revised after 1976.
11. It is clear that the liberal ideology of toleration is perversely contradictory. It is possible,
however, that the contradictions I uncover in this article are functional and not dysfunctional. Whether
some action or concept is functional or dysfunctional would appear to turn on its goal. Therefore, if
we were to assume that the function of the law is to legitimate the exercise of power by dominant
social groups, then ideological contradictions would be functional. In this sense, my argument could be
turned on its head-I show not that liberal toleration is not working, but how the force of cultural
oppression works or functions in this particular and concrete context, by weaving ideological contradictions. In any case, dysfunction can also operate on a less theoretical plane. It can also encompass
the contradiction between the advertised function of the law-that which we are supposed to believeand the subtexts of that functioning, of which we are supposed to remain blissfully unaware. The
advertised goal-toleration doctrine is the protection of individual liberty; its subtext is the ability to
regulate and suppress the individual liberty of certain disfavored groups. In that sense, at least, notions
of liberal toleration explored in this article are dysfunctional. I am grateful to Professor Stephen
Feldman for this insight. For a discussion of this notion in the context of civil rights law, see infra
note 25.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss5/1

4

Backer: Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization of
DECRIMINALIZATION OF PRIVATE SEXUAL CONDUCT

must be kept hidden on the theory that public displays of heterosexual
vaginal sex between married people are not tolerated either. Even Bill and
Hillary Clinton must act furtively should they engage in sexual intercourse
in a public park or in their car, or risk the application of the criminal
law. 2 But this analogy misses the point. Society approves of public expressions short of actual heterosexual sexual acts, such as solicitations for
sex at one's home, hand holding, and kissing, while society condemns and
punishes similar behavior among gay men and lesbians. It is to that quite
significant extent that the modem trend of decriminalizing sexual acts
offers little; society remains free to criminalize presexual acts with respect
to which it is indifferent when men and women engage in such acts.
I can best illuminate the extent of the perversity of the mainstream
liberal toleration embedded in the Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal
Code by relating a parable-The Parable of the Dusty House. The parable
invites the reader to adopt the viewpoint of the "protagonist," the creature
of the parable. In the context of the parable, this article examines a single
example of the deleterious effect of the almost unconscious acceptance of
the perversity of liberal toleration as it evidences itself in the criminal law
of sexual conduct. I use the examination to argue that current notions
about protecting society from offensive conduct are fundamentally incompatible with freeing consensual sexual conduct from criminal regulation.
Indeed, my basic theme is that inherent in modem liberal notions of decriminalization of sexual nonconformist conduct is the understanding that
society has given little and purchased a great deal. In return for removing
the formal threat of severe criminal sanction for hidden and discrete acts
(which society had rarely enforced in any case), dominant heterosexual
society has sought the quiescence of sexual nonconformists-their tacit
agreement to hide themselves from view and spare the beneficent dominant culture the disgust of any type of public presence.
For purposes of illumination, 3 I will focus on the scheme of sexual
regulation of "deviate sexual intercourse" the Model Penal Code proposes,14 and particularly, its prohibitions against lewdness and solicitation.

12. But note that enforcement of state proscriptions of public sexual activity may vary depending
on the sex of the couple caught. Thus, a heterosexual couple caught engaging in intercourse in a

parked car might be lectured ("Why don't you folks rent a motel room?!") rather than cited for something like outraging public decency, or a similar offense, usually a misdemeanor. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a) (West Supp. 1994) (engaging in acts of lewdness). Two men caught under the
same circumstances would more likely be charged with a felony. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 500 S.W.2d
368, 370 (Ark. 1973) (concerning two adult males who were convicted of sodomy). They would be far
less likely to be lectured and sent home.
13. The notion inherent in the Wolfenden Report, that private immoral conduct ought to be beyond the reach of the law as long as it stays private, affects a number of areas, all of which are beyond the scope of this article. See supra note 8.
14. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) (1980). The term "deviate sexual intercourse" is defined as
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The Parable of the Dusty House is explored from the perspective of the
creature in part III entitled: "Be Yourself ... But Keep the Shades
Drawn." In part IV, "What We Preach," I examine the state of regulation
in light of the theories giving rise to the deregulation of private conduct.
The state of regulation is recast again in part V entitled: "What We
Practice," wherein I briefly examine the flow of the common statutory
reality-the manner in which private conduct has been "deregulated" but
"public" conduct has been "reregulated." I discuss the effect of this public/private distinction in part VI, "What We Really Preach." This is perhaps best read as one of the morals of the Parable of the Dusty House.
Shifting the interpretive focus of the parable from that of the creature to
that of the object of the creature's attention, the dust provides the moral.
The dust is neither animate nor worth knowing as other than a nuisance. It
does not speak with the voice of the creature.
I consider another moral of the Parable of the Dusty House in part
VII, "An Ending But Not a Conclusion." Certain groups, especially political groups, tend to appear to tolerate those whose conduct or beliefs deviate from the dominant group's cultural ideal. Thus, to a substantial extent,
toleration is by its nature fundamentally intolerant. Toleration arises from
a political inability to continue suppressing conduct, not from any sense
that the conduct tolerated is worthy of respect. Toleration in this guise is a
grudging activity; an easily-dissipated activity. It amounts to a forbearance
"sexual intercourse per os or per anum between human beings who are not husband and wife, and any
form of sexual intercourse with an animal." Id. This is a broader phrase than sodomy, and is intended
to be more inclusive. For a discussion of the meaning of the phrase as used in the Model Penal Code.
see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 1. For a general discussion of the evolution of the term "sodomy," see Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searchingfor the Hidden
Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1081-86 (1988); Janet E. Halley, Misreading Sodomy: A Critique of the Classification of "Homosexuals" in FederalEqual Protection Law, in
BODY GUARDS: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF GENDER AMBIGUtTY 351 (Julia Epstein & Kristina

Straub eds., 1991); Lawrence R. Murphy, Defining the Crime Against Nature: Sodomy in the United
States Appeals Courts 1810-1940, 19 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 49, 53-54 (1990).
15. Some attention has also been paid to the general closeting effect of suppressing public conduct while trumpeting the liberation of private conduct. See, e.g., Joseph J. Bell, Public Manifestations
of PersonalMorality: Limitations on the Use of Solicitation Statutes to Control Homosexual Cruising,
in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW 97, 97-114 (Donald C. Knutson ed., 1980). In contrast, current
antidiscrimination strategy focuses more on the elimination of the last remnants of suppression of
private conduct through enforcement of sodomy statutes, and on recognition of gay and lesbian relationships. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal
Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships, 8 J. L. & POL. 89, 90-105 (1991) (discussing perspectives on the changing treatment of the family under the law); Heidi A. Sorensen, Note, A New Gay
Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Sexual Orientation Discrimination,81 GEO. L.J.
2105, 2107 (1993) (arguing the merits of dynamic statutory interpretation to ameliorate the sexual
orientation bias of statutes dealing with immigration, sodomy, and family issues). In any case, the
people most interested in reformulating the dysfunction of the Wolfenden formulation appear to be,
naturally enough, those who feel the negative effects of the dysfunction. For them, the search for
equality and positive toleration continues despite the reverse progress of closeted acceptance.
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from suppression wherein dominant society preserves as legitimate its
power to express revulsion at the practices of sexual nonconformists-and
to manifest these expressions through the law. 6
Toleration continues to speak the language of disapproval when discussing the sexual practices and inclinations it has liberated. At least as
tolerance manifests itself in its treatment of sexual nonconformists, American society embarked forty years ago on a toleration of intolerance. Sexual
nonconformity, particularly sexual conduct between people of the same
sex, falls far beyond the limits of traditional American sexual conduct
norms-far enough to permit suppression. That same-sex conduct is no
longer actively suppressed is a mark of the indecisiveness of the sexually
dominant group in America as that group weighs the acceptability of the
types of sexual conduct those sexual nonconformists now practice more
openly. However, failure to suppress does not imply tolerance. That is the
trap for those who place such importance on eliminating the sodomy laws
as a means to acceptance and toleration. Such progress is ephemeral and
insubstantial while society is free to use the law to discourage private
immorality and to suppress its public expression.
II. THE PARABLE OF THE DUSTY HOUSE

Once upon a time, there was a creature who loved clean things. This
creature detested what appeared to it to be small things with which it
shared its world-what the creature called dust. As far as the creature
knew, the dust flew about, carried by the wind and the creature's movements, and appeared to contaminate everything it touched. The creature
convinced itself that the dust could not be good and was probably bad.
The creature was sure that the dust was responsible for fatal diseases and
bad conduct.
The creature made no attempt to communicate with what it called the
dust; after all, it was insignificant and so unlike the creature as to hardly
be deemed Life. And so, to separate itself from this dust, the creature decided to build a house. It was a beautiful house, meant to be clean and,
therefore, dust free, with windows looking out over a great expanse. But it
grew stuffy in the house, and the creature opened the windows one afternoon. To its horror it discovered that by nightfall the house had filled with
dust. Dust covered everything. The creature thought and thought, finally

16. Though beyond the scope of this article, contrast the relative ease with which society permits
the decriminalization of sodomy with society's resistance to permitting the recognition of marriages
between people of the same sex. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same Sex Marriage,

79 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1485-1510 (1993); William Rubenstein, The Stonewall Anniversary: 25 Years of
Gay Rights, HUM. RTS., Summer 1994, at 18, 18-19; Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage,29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 505, 505-06 (1994).
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hitting upon a solution. Abandoning the old dusty house, the creature built
a new house. The windows of the house were hermetically sealed. An
advanced climate control system with multiple filters circulated air, and
the entryways contained various dust catching devices. At last, the creature
thought, it could now escape contamination of the house. However, by
nightfall of the first day, the creature discovered that the house was again
dusty. The amount of dust had been significantly reduced from that in the
old house, but if it looked carefully, the creature could see dust everywhere.
The creature was at its wits' end. Technologically speaking, the creature could do nothing further to eliminate the dust entirely. Constant
cleaning was no real help either. While cleaning would remove the dust
temporarily, other dust would soon replace it. And the creature could
never be sure that it had eliminated all of the dust. No matter what the
creature tried, some dust would creep into its house. After some reflection,
the creature realized that it had lived all its life with the dust. While the
creature was convinced that it had contracted a number of colds from the
dust, it could expect to continue to exist even in the presence of the dust.
However, no matter how hard the creature tried to reconcile itself with the
existence of dust, it still felt an almost uncontrollable fear and dread about
dust. The creature understood that it would never really accept dust as
anything but a potentially threatening nuisance, and it certainly had no
intention of sharing its house with the dust.
The creature shrugged its shoulders, plugged in the vacuum cleaner,
and eliminated all of the visible dust. It picked up a broom and swept the
remaining dust from its sight. Whatever dust that remained could not be
seen. The creature was happy. And why not? If it could not get rid of the
dust, at least it could substantially reduce its effect. Anyway, the creature
could now pretend that the dust had disappeared. The dust seemed to
understand. Except for stray bits which continued to settle on the furniture
in the rooms of the house, the dust did not complain. But even if it did
complain it would not matter; the creature could not hear, would not listen, and had already decided that it understood the dust and its relationship to the dust well enough.
Both liberal and conservative America, like the creature in the Parable
of the Dusty House, continue to sweep sexual nonconformists into the
cracks and crevices of social existence. It is an endless and ultimately
unsuccessful task, but one that requires resort to every manifestation of
power, if only to achieve the limited result of a temporary and incomplete
disappearance of the problem. In the end, at every end, there is little to
show for the effort-what is hidden has not disappeared, and the creature
knows that. For all the effort, and all the futility, the dust still revolts the
creature sufficiently that the creature continues its efforts despite the con-
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scious knowledge of its futility. The creature has given up the attempt to
eradicate, concluding that the attempt to eradicate is just not worth the
effort. However, the act of sweeping away all evidence of the existence of
the dust, is, for the creature, still worth the effort.
And what of the material the creature called dust? The creature attempted to eradicate the dust, yet made no attempt to understand the dust.
The dust was a nuisance, not worth looking at or communicating with, nor
worth understanding. Indeed, in identifying the material as
dust-something inanimate and unconscious-the creature embodied the
determination that it could deal with the dust as a thing. The material
labelled dust neither disabused the creature of its possibly spurious view
of things, nor participated in the creature's determination to sweep the
dust into the dark places of the house.
Nausea was the means by which the creature dealt with the dust-a
thing insignificant and threatening, but not worth knowing.
[B]ut I do not think one can ignore disgust if it is deeply felt and
not manufactured. Its presence is a good indication that the bounds
of toleration are being reached. Not everything is to be tolerated.
No society can do without intolerance, indignation, and disgust;
they are the forces behind the moral law, and indeed it can be
argued that if they or something like them are not present, the
feelings of society cannot be weighty enough to deprive the individual of freedom of choice. 7
It is nausea which drives the conservative version of the creature to rid
itself of the dust, for the good of the creature. It is also nausea which
drives the liberal version of the creature to hide the dust, for the well
being of the dust. The price of toleration according to the liberal merchants of the stuff, our creature, is acceptance of nausea. However, too
much nausea will debilitate the creature in its conservative guise. Thus,
the recipients of toleration are obliged to devote their lives to minimizing
the public disgust which arises by reason of their existence. To ensure the
meeting of this obligation, the state is permitted, maybe even required, to
help in this endeavor. The only remaining question is the amount of tolerable nausea allowed-with how much dust must the creature live? With
this in mind, we can begin to appreciate the Parable of the Dusty House
and the problems of a blindly applied and self-delusionally well-intentioned methodology of liberal toleration.

17. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965), reprinted in MORALITY AND THE
LAw 15, 26-27 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1988).
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III. BE YOURSELF... BUT KEEP THE SHADES DRAWN
The Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code express the
aspirational goals of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence,"8 and in that
respect, they have been quite influential.19 They exist as a role model and
as the purveyor of our loftiest institutional jurisprudential sentiments on
the criminal law; they are the idealized form of sound legislation. For
sexual nonconformity, these aspirational ideals encompass two goals. The
first is decriminalization, and thus tolerance, of sexual nonconformity
hidden from view. 0 The second is punishment for violation of the
first-punishment for and the suppression of the public expression of any
nonconformist conduct or any interference with the state's power to express its nausea, disgust, and offense at any sexual expression permitted
when hidden.2
The approach the Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code adopted was intended to help usher in a world of greater tolerance. Instead, the
rhetorical shield of toleration has made it easier to perpetuate the state's
power to condemn, through criminal law, conduct which does not suit the
fancy of its lawmakers. The Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code
have given society license, stemming from the power to protect community values regarding public expression of sexual nonconformity, to enforce
the dominant morality. The Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code
have reserved for the dominant morality an exclusive place in the legal
order-all public space. The documents' liberality consists largely of the
miserly permission to sexual nonconformists to use the cracks and crevices
of what is left-a narrowly defined "private space"-for the furtive practices which offend the dominant morality. The permission is largely rhetorical; it is the difference between a sentence of death and one of life in

18. Its principles have also found their way into the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. For a discussion of the protection
of sexual nonconformists under international law, see Laurence R. Heifer, Lesbian and Gay Rights as
Human Rights: Strategies for a United Europe, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 157, 157 (1991). But see
Adamantia Pollis, Eastern Orthodoxy and Human Rights, 15 HuM. RTS. Q. 339, 353-56 (1993), for
the view that the Christian Orthodox world view is incompatible with Western European notions of
individual human rights.
19. Indeed, critics of the shift in the law to the libertarian principles of John Stuart Mill tend to
ascribe a substantial amount of blame for this phenomenon on the influence of both the Wolfenden
Report and the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., ROBERT E. RHODES, JR., LAW AND LIBERATION 157-58
(1986).
20. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, paras. 61, 355; MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2
(1980).
21. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 355 (advocating the modification, but not the
repeal of the crimes of buggery, gross indecency, indecent assault, and importuning for immoral purposes); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 251.1, .3 (1980) (proposing the crimes of open lewdness and loitering
to solicit deviate sexual relations).
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prison without the possibility of parole.
At bottom, the permission to use the private spaces of the social order
permits an unrelenting confirmation of the baseness of the privatized conduct, one which is so shameful it is not permitted to see the (societally

speaking) light of day. Such permission is linked with the affirmation of
the right to "suppress[ ] ...public nuisance[s]," and with the open flouting of community standards.2" The very rationales reek with the aroma of
nauseating conduct-conduct which is vile enough to be indirectly sup-

pressed. Mere offense becomes the touchstone for regulation;' offense
"will be based on moral, social or cultural standards.

24

This dysfunctional notion of tolerating sexual nonconformists has
permeated both liberaF and conservative26 thought. The notion appears

22. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2 (1980).
23. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 13 (stating the functions of criminal law).
24. Id. para. 15.
25. See, e.g., 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMaTS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW-HARMLESS
WRONGDOING 15-16 (1988); DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW 29-63 (1982);
Paul D. Carrington, The Moral Quality of the CriminalLaw, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 575, 580-81 (1959);
Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 393
(1963); Morris Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
217, 218-24 (1960); David AJ. Richards, UnnaturalActs and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: A
Moral Theory, 45 FORD. L. REV. 1281, 1333-46 (1977); Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold:
Foucauldianand Republican Approaches to Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 861, 868-77 (1991); Larry E.
Joplin, Note, CriminalLaw: An Examination of the Oklahoma Laws Concerning Sexual Behavior, 23
OKLA. L. REv. 459, 470-72 (1970). Even nonmainstream thinkers are susceptible to the allure of this
dysfunction, though they might argue that such dysfunction does not exist, or if it does exist, it is
irrelevant given the immediacy of a particular social or political agenda. From it may come the freedom (for weighty reasons) to marginalize the "other" (perhaps in the spirit of tit
for tat) in the process
of creating (morally favored) separateness within the imperative of inclusion (within the dominant
group). Thus, Ruthann Robson writes:
Within our own communities, theories, and relationships, the implementation of equality in
the form of antidiscrimination rules of law would bring out change.... If we accepted the
rule of law as the rule of lesbianism, we would not discriminate between lesbians and
nonlesbians. For many of us, this is unacceptable.
I am not proposing that we must either totally adopt antidiscrimination discourse into all
facets of our lives, or we must totally abandon it as a legal strategy. Such a duality is a
false one. We are not hypocritical, inconsistent, or contradictory if we recognize
antidiscrimination as a potential strategy for legal change, yet recognize its limitations. Our
desires are as complex as we are.
RUTHANN ROBSON, LEBIAN (OuT)LAw 89-90 (1992). But does this amount to little more than contradictory principles of the Wolfenden Report-a principled resort to ruthlessness, of the taking for oneself the power to include and exclude while suppressing the use of that power by others? See MOHR,
supra note 5, at 94-100. Professor Mohr states that "generally, an obligation to privacy, an obligation
to shield specific acts from the vision and hearing of nonparticipants, does not entail a requirement of
secrecy about the acts-and vice versa." Id. at 99. For an interesting approach to the private/public
space problem, see Harlon L. Dalton, "Disgust" and Punishment, 96 Yale L.J. 881, 897-900, 909-12
(1987) (reviewing 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw-OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985)). Professor Dalton argues that disgust-based harm should normally be exempted from punishment except, for the most part, when the disgusting conduct occurs within the personal space of the
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to have shaped European notions as well.27 The liberal canon emphasizes
the first part of the Wolfenden formula-that there is a realm of conduct
substantially beyond the reach of the criminal law.28 It downplays, but
does not disavow, the second part of the Wolfenden formula-that in the
furtherance of a societal morality, immoral public conduct can be suppressed.29 Traditionalists, to a greater or lesser degree, acknowledge the
existence of a zone within which the law has no business, but limits this
zone to conduct within the traditional patriarchal family.3" Traditionalists,
however, emphasize the second part of the Wolfenden formulation-that
the majority can use criminal law to protect its citizens from public indecency and offense.3 The difference between liberal and traditionalist positions, therefore, can be characterized more as one of line drawing than as
one of giving content to the Wolfenden formulation. Both have accepted
the notion of spheres of privacy and of the right of the state to suppress
public displays of deviant conduct.32

person disgusted. Id. In this sense, a sphere of personal privacy ought to be maintained for the protection of the nonconformist, rather than as a vehicle for their oppression. Id.
26. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 1011, 241-50 (1990); RHODES, supra note 19, at 167-69; Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of
Marriage,Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancingthe Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 463, 538 (1983); Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 521-22 (1989) (citing the Conference on Community, Law and
Moral Reasoning); Philip Selznick, The Idea ofa Communitarian Morality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 445, 44547 (1987). See generally ELIZABETH R. MOBERLY, HOMOSEXUALITY: A NEW CHRISTIAN ETHIC (1983)

(contending that homosexuality should be tolerated only in order for the condition to be healed).
27. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 18, at 157. "Although it is now taken for granted in nearly all
Western European nations that private sexual relationships between consenting adults can no longer be
criminalized, lesbians and gay men have had only partial success in convincing their governments, and
the European public, to recognize their other important social concerns." Id. These include public
issues such as equality in employment, marriage, and adoption. Id.
28. 4 FEINBERG, supra note 25, at 165-73; HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 304 (1968); JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 412-19 (1986).
29. 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW-OFFENSE TO OTHERS 1-5
(1985); MOHR, supra note 5, at 94-106.
30. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 547-48, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); BORK, supra note
26, at 110-26. To the extent that conduct other than that between husband and wife is acknowledged
to come within this zone it is done so on purely practical grounds. For instance, some traditionalists
can, if grudgingly, accept the notion of decriminalization of sodomy on grounds of efficiency, and to
the extent they remain free to continue to treat the practice as vile, and not worthy of emulation.
RHODES, supra note 19, at 153-85.
31. BORK, supra note 26, at 123-24. "But, in any event, physical danger does not exhaust the
categories of harms society may seek to prevent by legislation, and no activity that society thinks immoral is victimless. Knowledge that an activity is taking place is a harm to those who find it profoundly immoral.... Moral outrage is a sufficient ground for prohibitory legislation." Id.
32. For an interesting characterization of the line drawing engaged in by the courts in the area of
constitutional privacy jurisprudence, see Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral
Ideals in the Constitution?,58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 486-91 (1982). Professor Feinberg argues
that the Supreme Court has always "recognized the very anti-Millian interest in 'enforcing the requirements of decency' as a constitutionally legitimate one so long as it is not pressed unnecessarily

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss5/1

12

Backer: Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization of
DECRIMINALIZATION OF PRIVATE SEXUAL CONDUCT

Tolerating private conduct does not mean accepting the conduct tolerated.33 Ironically enough, it was a leading traditionalist critic of the time,
Patrick Lord Devlin, an outspoken opponent of the Wolfenden Report,
who, if somewhat derisively, exposed this dysfunction and warned of its
consequences almost forty years ago.
Some people sincerely believe that homosexuality is neither immoral nor unnatural. Is the "freedom of choice and action" that is
offered to the individual, freedom to decide for himself what is
moral or immoral, society remaining neutral; or is it freedom to be
immoral if he wants to be? The language of the [Wolfenden]
Report may be open to question, but the conclusions at which the
Committee arrive answer this question unambiguously. If society
is not prepared to say that homosexuality is morally wrong, there
would be no basis for a law protecting youth from "corruption" or
punishing a man for living on the "immoral" earnings of a homosexual prostitute, as the Report recommends. This attitude the
Committee make even clearer when they come to deal with prostitution. In truth, the Report takes it for granted that there is in existence a public morality which condemns homosexuality and prostitution. What the Report seems to mean by private morality might
perhaps
be better described as private behavior in matters of mor4
alS?
If, indeed, society means what its says about freedom of choice (for this is
what we have come to believe that we say), then should not society remain neutral in matters of sexual practice and not act to severely limit the
manner in which tolerated conduct is practiced? But it does not mean what
it says. Rather, society continues to impose its moral judgments of sexual
conduct through law, but only more discreetly, and all in the name of
protecting the sensibilities of society. We protect our youth against corrup-

beyond the proper boundaries of privacy." Id. at 489. The arguments about the extent of privacy
rights, then, consist of little more than line drawing. My thesis is that, whatever the line drawing with
respect to constitutionally protected private conduct rights, the line will be drawn quite narrowly respecting limits on the power of the state to control public conduct.
33. See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1049, 1051-53 (1994). This point is eloquently demonstrated by the storytelling of Marc Fajer. See
Fajer, supra note 3, at 570-607.
34. Devlin, supra note 17, at 19-20 (footnote omitted). Lord Devlin took the position that society
has the right to protect its own existence, and that society, as conceptualized by a majority of its mem-

bers, has the right to follow its own moral convictions in defending its social environment from changes it opposes. For a discussion of Lord Devlin's argument, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 240-58 (1977); BASIL MITCHELL, LAW, MORALITY, AND RELIGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY

1-18 (1967). For a discussion of the manner in which disgust and the suppression of immorality are

intertwined, see Dalton, supra note 25, at 906-09.
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tion (because nontraditional sexual practices are bad); we demand that
those we tolerate continue to hide. Contrary to advertised reality, society
has made preciously small, and cruelly perverse, strides in its toleration of
sexual conduct. Unfortunately, Lord Devlin's point, made in the context of
a broad traditionalist attack on the Wolfenden Report approach to decriminalization, was lost in the rush to climb aboard the Wolfenden Report
bandwagon, a rush in which even those with the greatest interest in pursuing strategies of greater positive tolerance participated." It is not at all
clear to me that, as Richard Mohr has declared, "Whither sodomy laws go,
so too do sexual solicitation laws. 36
I believe that Lord Devlin's point is well taken, and indeed, ought to
be better taken. Lord Devlin's "private behavior in matters of morals" is
the better characterization of the liberal ideal.37 That ideal accepts as a
given the need for the subordination of nonconformity. The necessary
subordination is measured on a scale of nausea.
Its presence is a good indication that the bounds of toleration are
being reached. Not everything is to be tolerated. No society can
do without intolerance, indignation, and disgust; they are the forc-

35. Thus, for instance, Joseph Bell, in arguing for the decriminalization of sexual solicitation
statutes, characterized both the Model Penal Code and the Wolfenden Report as rejecting "the use of
criminal law to deter sexual behavior because it is 'sinful, morally wrong, or objectionable for reasons
of conscience, or of religious or cultural tradition.' " Bell, supra note 15, at 102. The right to regulate
public manifestations of that private morality was unquestioned, only the drawing of the line between
regulated and unregulated public manifestation was troublesome. Id. at 103.
36. MOHR, supra note 5, at 55; see also Paula A. Brantner, Removing Bricks From a Wall of
Discrimination:State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 495, 496
(1992) ("Gay and lesbian activists consider the eradication of sodomy laws essential to the further
advancement of gay rights."). Of course, nothing appears to modem eyes to be absolute. In some
jurisdictions the solicitation statutes have appeared to follow the sodomy laws into oblivion. See Pryor
v. Municipal Court, 599 P.2d 636, 646-47 (Cal. 1979) (narrowing a California sexual solicitation law
to include only the solicitation to perform public acts, and the public touching of the genitals, buttocks, or female breast for purposes of sexual arousal); Commonwealth v. Sefranka, 414 N.E.2d 602,
606 (Mass. 1980) (voiding a solicitation statute on constitutional grounds); People v. Uplinger, 447
N.E.2d 62, 63 (N.Y. 1983) (overturning New York's sexual solicitation statute on constitutional
grounds), cert. dismissed, 467 U.S. 246 (1984). But even in jurisdictions where the repeal of the sodomy laws may have contributed to the evisceration of the sexual solicitation laws, it is not clear that
the resulting legal environment is substantially more open to the activities of the public sexual nonconformist. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(d) (West Supp. 1994) (criminalizing loitering); People v. Superior Court (Caswell), 758 P.2d 1046, 1057 (Cal. 1988); Pamela Sirkin, Comment, The Evanescent
Actus Reus Requirement: California Penal Code § 647(d)-Criminal Liability for "Loitering With
Intent... " Is Punishment for Merely Thinking Certain Thoughts While Loitering Constitutional?, 19
Sw. U. L. REV. 165, 165-66 (1990) (arguing that, as interpreted, the loitering statute still provides the
state with a largely standardless means of harassing people whose views or lifestyles are not in favor);
infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. I take a somewhat more critical view of the advances represented by cases of this type. See infra part IV.
37. Devlin, supra note 17, at 20.
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es behind the moral law, and indeed it can be argued that if they
or something like them are not present, the feelings of society
cannot be weighty enough to deprive the individual of freedom of

choice.3"

Under this liberal conceptualization, disgust can drive the law, and the
law provides the means to service disgust. The measure of disgust is the
perceived distance between the norm and that being measured, which, by
definition, is not the norm. Distance is measured not only by difference,
but by the relation between that being measured and the conduct rules of
the norm givers.39 Liberal protection of "private behavior in matters of
morals" concedes to traditionally dominant social and cultural groups the
power to enforce its mores directly and indirectly-to determine and con-

demn group affronts. The adherents worry only at the margin; this provides another manifestation of the line drawing encouraged by the
Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code approach. The difference between liberal and traditionalist is that the latter knows where to draw the
line between tolerated disgust and everything else. The liberal accepts the
necessity of instruction in social disgust and of the participation by
government in this endeavor. Liberal ideology seeks merely to contain
disgust, like our creature in the parable, by finding a place where the
creature will not search and the object of disgust can hide.'

It is thus "OK" to characterize certain conduct, particularly sexual

38. Id. at 26-27 (footnote omitted).
39. Thus, for instance, insertion of a penis into a vagina in the missionary position is different
from the same act when a woman straddles her partner, not too different, but for some, perhaps different enough. Compare, however, anal intercourse between men. This is not only substantially different
from the norm (heterosexual vaginal intercourse), but also fundamentally violates core conduct taboos
of the norm givers-both the penetration of the anus for purposes of sexual gratification and sex between people of the same gender are absolutely prohibited. As a result, the former conduct may be
derided by the norm givers as unconventional and troubling, and rarely punished, but the latter conduct
approaches the definition of cultural nausea and is suppressed.
40. Thus, for instance, Professor Feinberg frets about what to do about offending others. See 2
FEINBERG, supra note 29, at 1-24. For an interesting critique of this need to worry, see Dalton, supra
note 25, at 901 (criticizing the offense principle as deeply flawed and arguing that "disgusting conduct
should be placed beyond, not within, the reach of the criminal law"). Professor Feinberg, however, has
no problem agreeing that the state may criminalize conduct which offends but otherwise causes no
direct harm to others. I JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL Limrrs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW-HARM TO OTHERS 3, 14 (1984). This view has also been criticized. See, e.g., Richard Warner, Liberalism and the
Criminal Law, 1 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY W. 39, 41 (1992) (arguing "that liberalism's line drawing aspirations are futile: in the area of the criminal law, there is no bright line that defines the limit of
state power."). Traditionalists are more sure about where to draw the line. Arguing against the enactment of gay rights legislation, Robert Rhodes argues that "the proponents of such legislation want to
'come out of the closet,' that is, to have homosexuality accepted as an alternative mainstream lifestyle,
one that can be publicly professed without adverse consequences. This I would be unwilling to concede." RHODES, supra note 19, at 169.
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conduct other than heterosexual vaginal intercourse, as deviant, immoral,
or offensive, and to act on the basis of such characterizations to suppress
its public expression. 4' Under the liberal canon (but less so under the
conservative or traditionalist canon), sexual liberation is limited to the
practice of immoral acts by people in secret, hidden from view. Thus
hidden, the conduct can retain its status as a societal wrong. The perversity of this liberation has been awesome. The toleration of a mere clandestine existence permits the "tolerant" society to feel good about the extent
of its tolerance. 42 But, it simultaneously permits this tolerant society the
luxury of continuing to regulate the manifestation of the object of its
tolerance in a manner that confirms to all but the dead that the conduct is
disgusting, filthy, deviant, sick, and not worthy of emulation.43
The authors of the Wolfenden Report intended this perverse liberation
(or at least may have hoped for it), as did the authors of the Model Penal
Code." The drafters consciously intended to incorporate such sentiments
into mainstream thought in this manner. These sentiments are embodied in
approaches to the solution of toleration of the types of sexual conduct

41. The term "public" is meant to be construed quite broadly. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 251.1
cmt. 2, at 451-52, 251.3 cmt. 3, at 478-79 (1980). The definition of public is so broad, in fact, that it
effectively makes public what, for sexual nonconformists, has been viewed as "private space." See,
e.g., LAUD HUMPHREYS, TEA ROOM TRADE: IMPERSONAL SEX IN PUBLIC PLACES 1-15 (1970) (discussing various behavior environments). For a discussion of the difference between private and public
space, see MOHR, supra note 5, at 104-05. For a discussion of the means by which the division between public and private space is affected, see Fajer, supra note 3, at 570-607. In fairness, the Model
Penal Code's comments recognize the abusive potential of the statute and attempt to limit the potential
breadth of its interpretation. The revised comments explain: "A 'gay' bar, for example, might fit that
description [of a public place], but a person who goes to such an establishment is unlikely to be affronted or annoyed by solicitation. At the very least, he has assumed the risk of that occurrence."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 3, at 478 (1980). Note, however, that this language is a product,
not of the intent of the drafters of the Model Penal Code, but of the revisors of the Model Penal
Code's comments more than 15 years after the adoption of the Model Penal Code. I believe it may
reflect the good intentions of the comment revisors but does not reflect the scope or intent of the provision itself.
42. Thus, society can be comforted by believing that at least they did not condemn them to
death, as they could have. For a discussion of the traditional treatment of sexual nonconformity in the
Anglo-American world, see Polly Morris, Sodomy and Male Honor: The Case of Somerset, 1740-1850,
16 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 383, 383-406 (1988); Robert F. Oaks, Perceptions of Homosexuality by Justices of the Peace in Colonial Virginia, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 15, at 35-41;
Robert F. Oaks, "Things Fearful to Name": Sodomy and Buggery in Seventeenth-Century New England, 12 J. Soc. HIST. 268, 268 (1978).
43, Society can in this way continue to derive pleasure from the thought that it is doing its bit for
the conversion of the perverted by making the cost of such conduct so high that one would have to be
socially or economically insane to persist in the conduct. Marc Fajer discusses the effect of this social
opprobrium as it extends even to sickness, death, and beyond. See Fajer, supra note 3, at 577-84. For
a discussion of the effect of disgust or empathy in shaping constitutional interpretation, see Lynne N.
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1574-77 (1987).
44. See THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 355. The Comments to the Model Penal
Code are quite clear on this point. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.2 cmt. 2, 251.3 cmt. 2 (1980).
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which violate majority conduct-norm taboos in every aspect of life in the
United States-the result of the "solution" to the "problem" of gay men
and lesbians in the United States military provides an almost apocryphal
example of the permeation of this approach.45 Such sentiments lie even at

the root of the discomfort with the notion of diversity in academia 4" and
create what, in other circumstances, would be considered bizarre moral
dilemmas, principally "outing.

47

45. During the 1992 presidential campaign, then candidate Clinton promised to eliminate the
military's ban on gay men and lesbians. When, in January 1993, President Clinton proposed to officially lift the ban, he met with a substantial amount of resistance in Congress and from high military
officials. In July 1993, a compromise was approved by the parties under which homosexual conduct
would continue to be banned on and off military establishments, and military personnel would still be
subject to dismissal for declaring their sexual orientation. However, recruiters would no longer ask
about sexual orientation, nor would military personnel be investigated unless there was evidence of homosexual conduct. See Clifford Krauss, With Caveat, House Approves Gay-Troops Policy, N.Y.
TIMAES,
Sept. 29, 1993, at A15 (discussing the so-called "don't ask, don't tell" policy). The effect, of
course, is in keeping with the Model Penal Code approach to the toleration of sexual nonconformity-as long as the dominant group can pretend it does not exist, then it will not be ferreted out and
punished. When exposed to the light of day, however, the traditional approach (suppression) will prevail. In this sense, we continue to allow societal notions of disgust to guide policy. For a discussion of
the use of disgust in this manner, see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 314-23 (1992). But see
Selland v. Aspin, 832 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993) (granting a preliminary injunction barring discharge
based on sexual orientation); Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1458
(C.D. Cal. 1993) (enjoining the government from enforcing rules excluding gay men and lesbians from
the armed forces), stay denied, 61 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42, 197 (9th Cir. 1993). For a discussion
of the basis of current military policy, see Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward Homosexuals:
Scientific, Historical,and Legal Perspectives, 131 MEL. L. REv. 55, 99-103 (1991).
46. See Sherman, supra note 2, at 123-24 (arguing for the need to include more gay males and
lesbians on law school faculties). Professor Sherman notes that "the invisibility of most gays and lesbians contributes to their oppression. The ground beetle's camouflage may protect the creature from
isolated predators, but it increases the likelihood of his being stepped on." Id. at 124.
47. Outing refers to revealing the sexual preference of people, usually, but not always, celebrities
and public officials. It has been used almost exclusively to describe the revealing of the homosexuality
of its object. The morality of outing has been debated most visibly in the popular press. For a discussion of the issues of outing, see ROBSON, supra note 25, at 73-77; Susan J. Becker, The Immorality of
Publicly Outing Private People, 73 OR. L. REv. 159 (1994); Jon E. Grant, Note, "Outing" and Freedom of the Press: Sexual Orientation'sChallenge to the Supreme Court's CategoricalJurisprudence,
77 CORNELL L. REv. 103, 104-08 (1991); David H. Pollack, Comment, Forced Out of the Closet:
Sexual Orientation and the Legal Dilemma of "Outing," 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 711, 715-16 (1992).
Kendall Thomas, among others, has noted that, in the context of a constitutional right to privacy, "gay
men and lesbians are aware that the chief value of the language of privacy is that it can be used not so
much to provide a space for self-discovery, but to provide against the dangers of disclosure." Kendall
Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431, 1455 (1992). On the costs of keeping sexual nonconformity hidden, see, e.g., Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay
Men: A Proposalfor True Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 47, 59-61 (1993).
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IV. WHAT WE PREACH

Let us take a closer look at the nature of our society's limited acceptance of sexual nonconformity. Late Twentieth Century Anglo-European
society preaches toleration and love (or at least toleration). Tolerance is
defined by dominant culture as "[t]he capacity for or practice of recognizing and respecting the opinions, practices, or behavior of others. 48 The
United States is a nation, we have been told repeatedly, built on toleration. 9 However, toleration is not a word of unitary meaning. Tolerance
also has another definition: "The permissible deviation from a specified
value of a structural dimension."5 That is, toleration need not be an infinitely elastic principle and tends to cluster around a norm." The norm
itself assumes critical importance as the referent for determining whether
and to what extent a given form of expression is to be suppressed. The
operative norm in Western Europe and North America is heterosexual
vaginal intercourse within a state-recognized marriage relationship. 2
But in the occasional case where the issue of our custom and
mores is specifically presented to the court the community's idealized judgment concerning the kind of morality it desires is likely
to weigh more heavily upon the prosecutor or the judge's decision
than the data of the Kinsey Report. This may be wrong, but it is
society in action. 3

48. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1275 (2d college ed. 1982).
49. See, e.g., JOHN M. SWOMLEY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE SECULAR STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 9 (1987); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address of the President of the United States
Before a Joint Session of Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 77 CONG. REC. 44-47 (1941) (providing the text
of President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" Speech).
50. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1275 (2d college ed. 1982). This is a definition at once
technical (defining a term with scientific or mathematical applications), and as I argue in this article,
jurisprudential as well.
51. The norm is the standard model or pattern regarded as typical for a specific group. Applied to
the societal interaction of different peoples, the reference, of course, is to status or conduct norms.
These are determined by the dominant group in society. "A legal system is based upon a few primary
postulates. Thus, in our society we recognize, among others, . . . the institution of the family." Frank
E. Horack, Jr., Sex Offenses and Scientific Investigation, 44 ILL. L. REv. 149, 150 (1949) (discussing
the impact of the Kinsey Report on the enforcement of sexual conduct laws); see also Schnably, supra
note 25, at 865-68 (noting the problematic nature of the role of the courts in divining and elaborating
fundamental social values, that is, the traditional values of the dominant group); cf Selznick, supra
note 26, at 445 (discussing the tension within contemporary or welfare liberalism).
52. For a critical history of the development of this norm over two millennia, see generally
JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAWS, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1987); ERIC
FUCHS, SEXUAL DESIRE AND LOVE: ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN ETHIC OF SEXUALITY
AND MARRIAGE 84-171 (Marsha Daigle trans., 1983).
53. Horack, supra note 51, at 157-58. The Kinsey Report presented empirical evidence that social
realities deviated significantly from the idealized norm of proper sexual conduct. For the complete
Kinsey Report referenced in the quoted material, see ALFRED C. KINSEY Er AL., INSTITUTE FOR SEX
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Our antecedent, the principles set forth in the Wolfenden Report,
proceeded on the basis of the second definition. The Wolfenden Report is
the primogenitor of criminal regulation of sexual conduct in late Twentieth
Century America. The Wolfenden Report's core teachings about the

criminalization of sexual conduct, particularly sexual conduct not conducted within the marriage relationship,' has found its way into the Model
Penal Code."
Incorporating the notions of John Stuart Mill, 6 the Wolfenden Report

drew a distinction between private sexual morality and sexual conduct
which could be criminal.
There remains one additional counter-argument which we believe
to be decisive, namely, the importance which society and the law
ought to give to individual freedom of choice and action in matters of private morality. Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made
by society, acting through the agency of the law, to equate the

sphere of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of
private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms,
not the law's business.5 7

This language is the stuff of a toleration fantasy, a potentially limitless
libertarian emancipation proclamation.58 But wait, there is more. "To say

RESEARCH, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948) and ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR INTHE HUMAN FEMALE (1953).
54. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) (1980) ("Deviate sexual intercourse"). It is this conduct,
and the states of being flowing from the desire to engage in this conduct, with which I am concerned.
55. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmL 2, at 371-73 (1980); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LmERTY
AND MORALITY 13 (1963); PACKER, supra note 28, at 306.
56. JOHN S. MtLL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1st ed. 1859). John Stuart Mill argued
that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
not a sufficient warrant." Id. at 68. For a discussion of the political and moral philosophy of John
Stuart Mill, see generally WENDY DONNER, THE LIBERAL SELF: JOHN STUART MILL'S MORAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1991).
57. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 61.
58. Thus, in disputing the arguments of Lord Devlin, H.L.A. Hart argues:
This (the alternative of permissiveness) is what Lord Devlin seems to envisage or to fear
when he says: "The enemy of society is not error but indifference," and "Whether the new
belief is better or worse than the old, it is the interregnum of disbelief that is perilous." On
the other hand the alternative may be not permissiveness but moral pluralism involving
divergent submoralities in relation to the same area of conduct.
H.L.A. Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12 (1967)
(footnote omitted) (quoting PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 114 (1965)); see also
DWORKIN, supra note 34, at 240-58 (critically examining Lord Devlin's assertion respecting the duty
of society to enforce community morality); Carrington, supra note 25, at 579-85 (discussing the use of
moral sanctions to condemn behavior as effectively as criminal penalties). But see William N.
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[that some conduct is beyond the criminal law] is not to condone or encourage private immorality."59 In this manner, the Wolfenden Report was
quick to disabuse those who feared that decriminalization of private conduct implied any sort of public expression of toleration of the conduct decriminalized. "It seems to us that the law itself probably makes little difference to the amount of homosexual behavior which actually occurs;
whatever the law may be there will always be strong social forces opposed
to homosexual behavior."' Thus, the lofty ideal of decriminalizing private expression should not bar society from continuing to marginalize that
which is offensive, but to merely tolerate that which appears not worth the
economic effort to eradicate.
To ensure that the strong social forces opposed to homosexual behavior would neutralize the danger of the proselytizing homosexual,6 the
Wolfenden Committee was quick to enlist the power of the state. Through
the criminal law, the state retains the power to regulate public expression
of this immoral conduct.62 "[The] function [of the criminal law], as we
see it, is to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from
what is offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against
exploitation and corruption of others .. ."'6 As such, the state retains the
traditional power to define and defend public morality. "It is also part of
the function of the law to preserve public order and decency. We therefore
hold that when homosexual behavior between males takes place in public
it should continue to be dealt with by the criminal law."'64 As long as
British sexual nonconformists were content to keep their sexual personae
to themselves, the Commission was willing to extend to them only relief
from direct criminal liability for their hidden sexual conduct. The Commission refused any sort of positive toleration, for that would have implied
an acceptance of such conduct which the Commission was unwilling to
make!
The Model Penal Code provisions expressed in legal form the

Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal
Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 383-85 (1992) (book review) (commenting on the ineffectiveness of traditional libertarian liberalism to address the real needs of sexual nonconformists).
59. THE WOLFENDEN IREPORT, supra note 9, para. 61.
60. Id. para. 58. For a discussion of the manner in which negative social and legal attitudes towards sexual nonconformity are best understood as preserving traditional gender roles and the social
meaning attached to these roles, see Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 187-96.
61. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 58.
62. Id. para. 64 (stating the conception of the difference between public and private conduct).
This notion reflects the traditional understanding of the regulatory role of law. See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1430-32 (1974).
63. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 13; accord id. para. 257.
64. Id. para. 49.
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Wolfenden Report's underlying public-private dichotomy. On the one
hand, the Model Penal Code decriminalized certain forms of sexual nonconformity.6' The decriminalization represented a fundamental departure
from existing law at a time when every state criminalized sodomy,' especially sodomy engaged in by people of the same sex.6' The authors of
the Model Penal Code took the position that private homosexual conduct
ought to be decriminalized because of "uncertainty about the morality of
such conduct."68
The drafters of the Model Penal Code considered, and rejected as
either unfounded or irrelevant, the notion that homosexual sodomy was a

sin or a disease.69 They also noted, but refused to embrace, the notion
that homosexuality "is simply a matter of personal preference and is devoid of any normative content whatever."7 Instead, a number of practical
considerations appeared to influence the drafters' conclusion that decriminalization was appropriate.7 The Wolfenden Report supplied the
decisive factor favoring decriminalization: "the importance which society
and the law ought to give to individual freedom of choice and action in
matters of private morality."72
On the other hand, the drafters of the Model Penal Code went to great

lengths to confirm the state's authority to control public nonconformist
sexual expression.73 They were quick to reassure that "the exclusion [of
criminal liability for consensual adults' acts of sodomy] does not reach
open display, which is covered by Section 251.1 ... nor public solicitation, which is proscribed by Section 251.3. " 74 To resolve any potential

65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (1980).
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 1, at 360 n.1l (1980).
67. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 362-63 (1980).
68. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 367 (1980).
69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmL 2, at 367-68 (1980). The comments to the Model Penal
Code rejected these notions, not because they disagreed, but because they were unconvinced that there
existed a national consensus on either point. Id.
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 369 (1980). It noted that this was the position of the
"gay rights movement, and it may be gaining support in the community at large." Id. (footnote omitted).
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 370-71 (1980). Among the reasons were finite economic resources resulting in a diversion from more serious crimes, the difficulty of detecting the
crime, and the resulting opportunities for the proliferation of other crime related to the lack of adequate enforcement (blackmail, official extortion, and increasing resort to entrapment as (an unsavory)
means of enforcement), and the futility of punishment (it would neither deter nor inhibit the conduct
proscribed). Id.
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 372 (1980) (quoting THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 61).
73. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 251.1, .3 (1980) (dealing with the protection of community
standards of public decency).
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 363 (1980). Interesting, in this respect, is the almost
casual basis on which these prohibitions, ancient in origin, and closely related to the proscriptions of
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misunderstanding, the drafters explicitly retained the ancient equating of
public nonconformist sexual expression with public nuisance."
The condemnation of tolerated conduct could not have been more
open. The creation or expression of a (positive) public identity was suppressed; the possibility of a positive public identity was not even suppressed as a political act.76 Instead, it was treated like any other revolting
nuisance, like one traditionally treated the operation of a nearby animal
glue factory spewing noxious odors. Why? Because the problem was not
with private behavior in matters of morals, but with the positive exhibition
of those behaviors, with even the slightest flouting.
Persons who publicly seek or make themselves available for deviate sexual relations openly flout community standards. Moreover,
indiscriminate solicitation in public streets, parks, and transportation facilities is not only an affront to moral and aesthetic sensibilities; it is also a source of annoyance to, and harassment of,
members of the public who do not wish to become involved. 7

the crime of sodomy, survived at the time that the Model Penal Code Reporters were self-consciously
taking the "radical" step of decriminalizing private acts of sodomy. The comments to MODEL PENAL
CODE § 251.3 (1980) (criminalizing "Loitering to Solicit Deviate Sexual Relations") explained that this
provision had originally been part of a comprehensive provision on sodomy and related offenses.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2, at 475 (1980). But even after the decision to decriminalize private acts of sodomy, the Reporters determined that the public nuisance rationale was sufficiently persuasive to retain the prohibition on public acts of solicitation. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2, at
476 (1980).
75. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2, at 476 (1980). The rationale for retaining the criminal
offense of public solicitation of deviate sexual relations was "the suppression of public nuisance." Id.
On the origins of this relationship between nuisance and sexual expression in the law, see ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/11-9 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (public indecency). Professor Feinberg, among liberal
thinkers, has also opted for a nuisance approach to the regulation of disgusting conduct, distinguishing
it from a privacy/property approach by arguing that the latter lends itself overmuch to the creation of
boundaries between the private domains of individuals and between the private domains of persons
and the outside world. 2 FEINBERG, supra note 29, at 24. Though nuisance lends itself to balancing,
id., and on that basis is more appealing, the result of balancing and boundary drawing is still the same.
In the end, by whatever route is taken, nausea will condemn certain conduct to outlawry, that is, to
existence without the protection (from concepts like nuisance) extended as a matter of course to other
(approved) conduct.
76. Contrast, for instance, the manner in which society debates the criminalization of another
species of antisocial activity which is said to threaten the social order-subversive activities. See, e.g.,
Vasiliy A. Vlasihin, Legal Theory: Political Rights and Freedoms in the Context of American
Constitutionalism:A View of a Concerned Soviet Scholar, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 257, 257-61 (1990);
Graham Zellick, Spies, Subversives, Terrorists and the British Government: Free Speech and Other
Casualties,31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 773, 773-75 (1990); David Berry, Note, The First Amendment
and Law Enforcement Infiltration of Political Groups, 56 S.CAL. L. REV. 207, 208-20 (1982); Steven
J. Burr, Comment, Immigration and the First Amendment, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1926-27 (1985).
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2, at 476 (1980) (loitering to solicit deviate sexual relations). The same rationale supported the criminalization of "open lewdness." See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 251.1 cmt. 2, at 449 (1980) ("Section 251.1 reaches the open flouting of community standards re-
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It was more than that. The drafters also aimed the antisolicitation provisions at "suppressing indiscriminate seeking or availability for deviate

sexual relations."78 The open lewdness provisions may include many acts
of affection of a nonconformist nature.79
The Model Penal Code drafters were most concerned with the viola-

tion of the public space by sexual nonconformists. Both statutes
criminalizing sexual nonconformity criminalized only acts occurring in
public." The adopting jurisdiction had the discretion to determine what
constituted public space.8 It was clear, though, that the term could be
quite broadly construed. 2 The overriding concern with the protection of
the public space overrode even concerns about problems of entrapment in

private sexual nonconformity." In this way, punishment remains "a cul-

garding sexual and related matters."). For a discussion of the problem of flouting, see Fajer, supra
note 3, at 587-91.
78. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 3, at 476 (1980). Thus, it seems, the toleration furthered
by decriminalization was meant to extend only to private consensual conduct between people of "prior
acquaintance." Id. Otherwise, the state could use the law of criminal solicitation to suppress even the
invitation to potentially sexual (or merely affectionate) conduct unless this conduct was effected in
hiding. Id. The casual conversation, the invitation or suggestion, occurring in the societal space reserved for sexual conformists was forbidden-representing as it did a (false) claim to legitimacy of
conduct that the state clearly condemned (though did not suppress if conducted in the small private
space reserved for it).
79. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.1 cmt. 2, at 452 (1980). "The term 'lewd' has been chosen to
designate the forbidden quality of acts covered by Section 251.1. It has the advantage of being the
term commonly found in prior legislation and of being more specifically sexual in connotation than is
the word 'indecent,' for example." MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.1 cmt. 2, at 450 (1980). The comments
to § 251.1, interestingly enough, appear more concerned with whether or not nudist camps would
(wrongly) be brought within the meaning of the provision than with any other concern raised by this
provision. See id.
80. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 251.1 cmts. 1-2, .3 cmrts. 1-2 (1980).
81. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 251.1 cmt. 2, at 452, .3 cmt. 3, at 478 (1980).
82. Thus, the open lewdness provision "recasts this element of the offense in terms of the known
likelihood of observation by persons who would be affronted or alarmed.' MODEL PENAL CODE §
251.1 cmt. 2, at 452 (1980). The loitering to solicit deviate sexual relations provision defines public
places as including anywhere where the public or a substantial group has access. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 251.3 cmL 3, at 478 (1980). The comment noted that places such as gay bars might easily fit into
this definition, but suggested that the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk (note the negative
connotations of the activity implicit in the assumption of this "defense") might apply. Id.; see also THE
WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 64 (stating that "in private" as used in the Wolfenden Report
is intended to apply to places where the public could not see or be offended).
83. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmL 3, at 476-77 (1980) (noting that the Colorado Supreme Court had determined that a similar provision was constitutionally infirm, but with dissenters
urging an interpretation requiring that an actor engage in conduct strongly corroborative of a purpose
to solicit, which would save the statute). The entrapment concerns implicit in an approach like this
were largely ignored. For a discussion of the entrapment problem with sexual solicitation statutes, see
Mitchell B. Nisonoff & Evan Wolfson, The Defense of Consensual Sodomy, Public Lewdness and
Related Criminal Cases, in THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES § 7.05[2] (B. Anthony
Morosco ed., 1994); Steven A. Rosen, Police Harassment of Homosexual Women and Men in New
York City 1960-1980, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 159, 159-90 (1980-81).
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tural art[ifact, embodying and expressing society's cultural forms."
Indeed, the very language of even this idealized form of law making
carefully conveys the full expressive weight of condemnation, even as it
speaks the name of the crime. Thus, for example, the Model Penal Code
still speaks of deviate sexual intercourse as any intercourse other than
heterosexual vaginal intercourse." Even the most well meaning drafters
unconsciously used the language of subordination. The law is crafted to
insult and to bring the full weight of moral opprobrium to bear on the
sexual nonconformist, even as it suppresses. Thus, the law punishes "lewdness" and "public indecency" related to "deviate sexual intercourse."
These are both words of insult in the popular idiom and words of description. The drafters consciously used the words to insult, carrying over the
meaning from traditional (moral) legislation.86 Insult serves to further
closet and to enforce the private/public boundaries of sexual nonconformity. This, then, is a toleration chained to a nausea born of disgust. Sexual
nonconformity may no longer be an abominable crime against nature, but
it remains a sign of social (and perhaps even medical) deviance, even in
the eyes of the law.87 And this language of tolerance, perhaps, makes it
more pernicious."t
Thus, the decriminalization of private sexual conduct amounts to
something other than a desire to ameliorate the subordinate social position
of sexual nonconformists. Decriminalization does little more than acknowledge the reality that enforcing laws suppressing certain forms of
private consensual activity is largely impossible,89 and may create more

84. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 193 (1990). For a discussion of the
theory of punishment as cultural artifact and expression of cultural norms, see id. at 193-211.
85. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) (1980) (defining deviant sexual intercourse as oral or
anal sexual intercourse between people who are not married to each other and any sexual intercourse
between people and animals). This is self-consciously a creature of the old morality based criminal law
from which it tells us it is liberating society. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980).
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.1 cmt. 2, at 450 (1980).
87. Courts have traditionally turned a deaf ear to arguments that the very descriptions of these
crimes are inflammatory and prejudicial. See, e.g., Larry C. Baker, Raping Sodomy and Sodomizing
Rape: A Morality Tale About the Transformation of Modern Sodomy Jurisprudence,21 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 37, 62-63 (1993).
88. See SAMUEL G. KLING, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 97-128 (1965) for an example of
this type of language. Mr. Kling writes that sexual nonconformists are inverts whose conduct is judged
by reference to normal individuals. Id. at 100. They are the product of castrating mothers and stand in
stark contrast to normal people. Id. at 101. A good example of this use of the language of condemnation in an ostensibly neutral setting is the discussion by Mr. Kling of the reasons that gay men and
lesbians are barred from the armed forces. Id. at 105; see also ROBSON, supra note 25, at 87 ("We
must prove the discrimination that we suffer with reference to a heterosexual norm. We exist in the
discourse of discrimination as victims, as deviants."); Halley, supra note 2, at 946-63 (discussing the
imposition of identity on sexual nonconformists by the dominant group-from whom deviance, and
the need for differentiation, arises).
89. See, e.g., Ploscowe, supra note 25, at 218, 221 (noting that the author was the associate re-
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crime than it prevents.' ° Public manifestations of sexual nonconformity,
on the other hand, might be worthy of psychiatric treatment.9' The
marginalizing power of the legal language of toleration has not been lost
on its targets (others might label them beneficiaries, rather than targets-after all, those released from total condemnation should show a

certain amount of gratitude). The 1980s and 1990s have seen an intense
effort to transform words of subordination into words of positive power.92
Decriminalization does nothing to soften the notion that the conduct
decriminalized is undesirable; the ideology underlying the Model Penal
Code and the Wolfenden Report reinforces the notion of undesirability. 3
Indeed, the selling of the decriminalization provisions appeared to the
drafters of the Model Penal Code to be dependant on acknowledging the

porter of the Model Penal Code during the 1950s).
90. This notion figured prominently in the calculus of the drafters of the Model Penal Code and
the Wolfenden Report. See THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, paras. 109-13, 121-23 (blackmail
and police misconduct); MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 3, at 476-78 (1980). It was also emphasized by contemporary commentators. See Morris Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32
BROOK. L. REv. 274, 284-85 (1966) (noting illegal sexual conduct creates a climate for blackmail and
police misconduct); Project-The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of
Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA L. REv. 643, 701-07 (1966) [hereinafter Project] (detailing police misconduct).
91. See, e.g., Ploscowe, supra note 90, at 283-85 (arguing that longer sentences and medical
treatment were appropriate for people convicted of sexual solicitation, even where private adult consensual sodomy was decriminalized). For a contemporary account of the medical explanation for the
disease of "sexual deviance," see Bernard Glueck, Sr., Sex Offenses: A Clinical Approach, 25 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 279 (1960). For a discussion of the use of language of psychiatry by the courts
in applying the criminal sex laws against sexual nonconformists, see, e.g., Backer, supra note 87, at
81-85.
92. For example, the emergence of groups like Queer/Nation. This group was described in a national gay and lesbian publication as follows:
They are trying to combine contradictory impulses: to bring together people who have been
made to feel perverse, queer, odd, outcast, different and deviant, and to affirm sameness by
defining a common identity on the fringes.... These contradictions are locked in the name
Queer Nation:
QUEER = DIFFERENCE
NATION = SAMENESS
Allan Bdrub6 & Jeffrey Escoffier, Queer/Nation, OUT/LOOK, Winter 1991, at 12, 14, reprinted in
Sheila Foster, Community and Identity in a Postmodern World, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 181, 193
(1992) (reviewing MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990)). In this effort, ironically enough, Queer/Nation mimicked the very contradictions at the heart of liberal toleration. The effectiveness of these groups and the manner and force of
societal response to their efforts is beyond the scope of this article.
93. Indeed, the continued societal imprimatur of nausea with regard to the manifestation of this
conduct was a significant selling point for the sodomy decriminalization reform effort. It is "in accord
with [the] goal of distinguishing behavior that is merely undesirable from that which 'is sufficiently
threatening to society to require the specialized effort of the criminal law to prevent it.' "Judy R. Potter, Sex Offenses, 28 ME. L. REv. 65, 92 (1976). Of course, any form of public expression of nonconformist sexual proclivity is the type of threatening conduct which is left to the specialized mercies of
the criminal law.
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critical separation between hidden conduct (largely ineradicable in any
case) on the one hand, and public conduct (which is threatening to the
basic social order-that is, of "normality" and "correct civic conduct") on
the other.'
The mainstream writings of the period were sympathetic to the
Wolfenden/Model Penal Code Project and the form of sexual liberation it
enunciated. Liberal popularizing commentators of the 1960s were quick to
embrace the dual standard of the Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal
Code as an equitable way of dealing with sexual nonconformists; "Only
when the homosexual act threatened the public good, did the matter become the responsibility of the law enforcement agencies."95 Indeed, the
proponents of this approach felt that they were probably doing gay men
and lesbians a favor-dominant society was convinced that sexual nonconformists preferred a life in the shadows. "The homosexual is isolated from
the mainstream of our society. To a large extent, the homosexual is still
considered a pariah, an outcast. He thus tends to live in isolation, accepting companionship only among fellow homosexuals. 96
The implication is obvious-as far as "normal" society is concerned,
even sexual nonconformists admit to both the unsavoriness of their conduct and the resulting need to exhibit their true natures only in the shadows. The dominant culture has abandoned this kind of talk in the 1990s,
substituting the language of flouting for that of disgust. But notions of
disgust, and perhaps the continuing belief in the sexual nonconformist's
self-disgust, also sustain the belief in the underlying notion that sexual
nonconformists serve as accomplices to their own marginalization.97 The
law merely confirms what appears to be the agreement of all parties concerned. This is meant to be the contribution of the criminal law to the
closeting of sexual nonconformists. The next part examines the reality of
such externally induced closeting.

94. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 3, at 370-71 (1980) (discussing the practical reasons for decriminalization) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.1 cmts. 1-2, at 448-50 (1980) (supporting
criminalization of open lewdness as a means of suppressing "the open flouting of community standards") and MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2, at 476 (1980) (suppressing public solicitation on the
same grounds).
95. KLING, supra note 88, at 126 (citing the Wolfenden Report in support of the conclusion that
private sexual practices ought to be decriminalized). Sam Kling was a relatively free-thinking legal
popularizer of the 1960s. His work provides a good example of the way nonesoteric liberal thought
operated to accept the decriminalization of sodomy but maintain substantial barriers to the legitimization of sexual nonconformists.
96. Id. at 111-12. And again, gay men and lesbians are characterized as despising the company
of, and being despised by, normal folk. "The homosexual is a creature apart, a social outcast." Id. at
105.
97. There exists a substantial amount of commentary on this notion. See Fajer, supra note 3, at
587-95; Halley, supra note 2, at 956-63.
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V. WHAT WE PRACTICE

The liberal ideal of limited and grudging toleration of private (hidden)
conduct has not been unanimously adopted; almost half of the states continue to proscribe even hidden nonconformist sexual conduct by consenting adults.98 How is the model of liberal toleration implemented in those
jurisdictions adopting the approach of the Model Penal Code? True to the
liberal ideal, those jurisdictions continue suppressing public expression of
nonconformity through solicitation, public indecency, loitering and disorderly conduct legislation." The legislatures have not acted alone; state
courts have served as willing handmaidens (to use a Biblical term) of the
Model Penal Code scheme. 1°° Thus, as states have increasingly opened a
small private area in which sexual nonconformists can exist without the
fear of the criminal law, states have continued to use the criminal law to

98. Currently, 25 states and the District of Columbia arguably continue to proscribe sodomy in
one form or another. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1994); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411 to
-1412 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1989 &
Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE §
18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Baldwin
1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1992);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, §§ 34-35 (Law. Co-op. 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158, .338,
.338b (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. §
201.190 (Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West
Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01(1), .06 (West 1994); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie Supp. 1994). But see Wasson v.
Kentucky, 842 S.W.2d 487, 501 (Ky. 1992) (holding that application of the statute to consensual homosexual activity was unconstitutional under the Kentucky Constitution); Commonwealth v. Balthazar,
318 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Mass. 1074) (holding that § 35, which criminalized unnatural and lascivious
acts, was unconstitutional as applied to private consensual adult behavior); Morales v. State, 826
S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. App. 1992) (holding that the statute was unconstitutional). On the increasingly
problematic nature of sodomy jurisprudence in these jurisdictions, see Backer, supra note 87, at 86117.
99. Indeed, the Model Penal Code approach to the criminalization of private conduct and the
continued suppression of public expression of a preference for that conduct spurred a tremendous
amount of debate at the state level. See Gordon B. Fields, Privacy "Rights" and the New Oregon
Criminal Code, 51 OR. L. REV. 494, 501-04 (1972); Robert G. Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisionsof
the ProposedNew Maryland Criminal Code: Should Private, ConsentingAdult Homosexual Behavior
be Excluded?, 30 MD. L. REV. 91, 102-08 (1970); Victor S. Johnson, III, Crimes Against Nature in
Tennessee: Out of the Dark and Into the Light?, 5 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 319, 323-39 (1975);
Ploscowe, supra note 90, at 277-79; Potter, supra note 93, at 65; Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offenses
and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 670-82 (1963); Ralph Slovenko, Sex Mores and
the Enforcement of the Law on Sex Crimes: A Study of the Status Quo, 15 KAN. L. REV. 265, 271-81
(1967); Don P. Stimmel, Criminalityof Voluntary Sexual Acts in Colorado, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 268,
268 (1968); Von Beitel, supra note 3, at 23; Irv S. Goodman, Comment, The Bedroom Should Not Be
Within the Province of the Law, 4 CAL. W. L. REV. 115, 116 (1968).
100. See People v. Superior Court (Caswell), 758 P.2d 1046, 1047 (Cal. 1988) (upholding the
constitutionality of a law prohibiting loitering in a public toilet for the purpose of engaging in lewd
acts).
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shut nonconformists out of any public area. Suppressing solicitation has
been a traditional means of regulating sexual nonconformity by states and
localities.'' Why? Because, other than the performance of the act itself,
solicitation (usually in a public place) to participate in even the expression
of sexual nonconformity constitutes the most self-aware and public form
of expression of the right not to hide. 2
Classical antisolicitation laws generally follow the pattern suggested
by the Model Penal Code. The Model Penal Code did not attempt to break
new ground in the penal law. 3 More interesting, from the perspective of
analyzing the ways society actually protects its public space from sexual
nonconformists, is the solicitation jurisprudence of those truly progressive
states where the crime of solicitation has been substantially narrowed. Let
us examine these progressive decisions more closely.
In People v. Uplinger,"°4 the New York Court of Appeals invalidated
the state's loitering statute on the same basis on which it had earlier invalidated the sodomy laws (at least as the statute involved private consensual
conduct). 5 The court of appeals did not, however, abandon the public/private distinction of the Model Penal Code or the Wolfenden Report."° Rather, the court left open the door for enactment of a constitutionally valid harassment statute based on the nuisance and annoyance
principles underlying the Model Penal Code approach.0 7 One of the significant disputes between the majority and Judge Jasen's dissent in
Uplinger revolved around whether the statute could be properly characterized as a harassment statute.' s The opinions imply that any changes

101. Project,supra note 90, at 691 n.30.
102. Indeed, in some states without a solicitation statute, solicitation is criminalized as an attempt
crime-attempt to violate the sodomy laws. See, e.g., State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 508 (Mo.
1986). For a discussion of the public element of solicitation, and its effects on nonconformist identity,
see Bell, supra note 15, at 98-101. For a lyrical expression of these notions, see JOHN RECHY, THE
SEXUAL OUTLAW (1977).
103. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2 (1980) (examining the origins of the solicitation
statute). For a critical discussion of solicitation laws, see Bell, supra note 15, at 97-114; Developments
in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1537-40 (1989) (discussing
applied and facial challenges to state solicitation statutes).
104. 447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1983), cert. dismissed, 467 U.S. 246 (1984).
105. Id. at 63.
106. Id. "Inasmuch as the conduct ultimately contemplated by the loitering statute may not be
deemed criminal, we perceive no basis upon which the State may continue to punish loitering for that
purpose. This statute, therefore, suffers the same deficiencies as did the consensual sodomy statute."
Id. (referring to the decision in People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980)).
107. Id. "We do not hold that the Legislature cannot enact a law prohibiting a person from accosting another in an offensive manner or in an inappropriate place even if the underlying purpose is not a
violation of the law." Id.
108. Thus, Judge Jasen, in dissent, and arguing from the Model Penal Code, saw no basis for not
treating the statute like a harassment statute.
Nor is it irrational for the Legislature to have decided that the presence of people soliciting
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in the notion of what constitutes actionable harassment could reopen the

door to validating statutes closer to the statute overturned in Uplinger.
Defining the distinction between a harassment and a nonharassment statute
becomes a function of caselaw. There can be little comfort in that. Preserving the Uplinger court's view becomes dependent on the values of the
members of that court. A different court could, consistent with the broad
themes of Uplinger, adopt the perspective of Judge Jasen.
In Pryor v. Municipal Court,"o the California Supreme Court nar-

rowed, but did not overturn, the solicitation statute at issue."0 However,
one can argue that the new interpretation substantially eviscerated the

provision's effect, so much so that the provision could be treated as, in
effect, repealed."' Two cautionary notes, however, serve to emphasize
that the court's decision is not all that far from its Model Penal Code
roots. First, the touchstone for regulation after Pryor remains public offense."' Second, the legislature, or the court as in Pryor, retains the
power to determine what conduct is likely to offend.' While the second
note is comforting to nonconformists in a case like Pryor in which the

court was sympathetic to sexual nonconformity, the point that judges tend
to change with surprising rapidity and that legislatures may more likely
than not reflect strongly held views of dominant society needs re-emphasis. Another court might define conduct likely to cause offense very differently. Though the Pryor court indicated that substantial constitutional
problems existed with any attempt to bring conduct which was itself lawful within the solicitation definition (like private consensual acts of sod-

in public to engage in sexual conduct is in and of itself annoying. In addition, such conduct
can be annoying, offensive and even threatening to those who are not directly solicited but
merely observe such conduct.
Id. at 64 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (referring to MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2, at 476 (1980)).
109. 599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979). It is interesting to note that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court adopted the California Supreme Court's approach in Pryor to narrow the construction of its own
lewdness statute. See Commonwealth v. Sefranka, 414 N.E.2d 602, 607-08 (Mass. 1980).
110. Pryor,599 P.2d at 636.
11i. The court held that the conduct criminalized under the statute
involves the touching of the genitals, buttocks, or female breast for the purpose of sexual
arousal, gratification, annoyance or offense, if the actor knows or should know of the presence of persons who may be offended by his conduct. The statute prohibits such conduct
only if it occurs in any public place or in any place open to the public or exposed to public
view; it further prohibits the solicitation of such conduct to be performed in any public
place or in any place open to the public or exposed to public view.
Id. at 647.
112. "The statute thus serves the primary purpose of protecting onlookers who might be offended
by the proscribed conduct." Pryor, 599 P.2d at 646. The court's job is to construct a "constitutionally
specific definition... limited to conduct of a type likely to offend." Id. at 647.
113. See id. at 644-46 (exercising the court's power to construe a statute to avoid constitutional
infirmity).
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omy), it did not absolutely foreclose the possibility. By not foreclosing the
possibility, the Pryor court's ruling suggests approval of the Model Penal
Code approach." 4 Another court, perhaps one with a less developed
sense of theoretical constitutional niceties, might find itself up to the task.
That other court might well have been the California Supreme Court
in its 1988 manifestation in People v. Superior Court (Caswell)."5 In
Caswell, the court rejected a constitutional challenge to the California
loitering statutes, under which the state charged several people with criminally loitering in a public toilet for purposes of engaging in or soliciting
lewd, lascivious, or unlawful acts." 6 While the acts themselves were limited to those defined in Pryor,"7 the Caswell court rejected the notion
put forward by the Pryor court that the "task of defining with constitutional specificity which forms of private lawful conduct, protected by the
Brown Act, are lewd or dissolute conduct, the solicitation of which is
proscribed by this statute" is probably impossible." 8
Instead, relying on the language and commentary of Model Penal
Code section 251.3, the majority asserted that they "can readily envision
numerous situations where noncriminal conduct may legitimately give rise
to probable cause to believe an individual is in violation of' the statute." 9 "Thus to be vulnerable to prosecution, a person must linger near a
restroom and think or fantasize about improper sexual acts or any other
crime on the books. No overt act. No advances toward any other person.
Just thoughts.' ' 2' Not just thoughts, but public thoughts that evidence

114. See id. at 646. "First, we need not attempt the probably impossible task of defining with
constitutional specificity which forms of private lawful conduct, protected by the Brown Act, are lewd
or dissolute conduct, the solicitation of which is proscribed by this statute." ld. The court, moreover,
avoided what it perceived to be a difficult First Amendment problem posed by a statute the scope of
which was uncertain, "for uncertainty concerning its scope may then chill the exercise of protected
First Amendment rights." Id. at 643. But see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1258, 1284-88 (1992) (arguing that our system of free speech fails to correct the repression
and abuse of subjected groups, but instead contributes to their subjection). The First Amendment has
not proven to be much of a problem for other courts. See State v. Phipps, 389 N.E.2d 1128, 1134
(Ohio 1979) (stating that the solicitation statute applies to "fighting words" but the very act of solicitation might be likely to provoke the average person).
115. 758 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1988).
116. Id. at 1048.
117. See id. at 1050 (citing Pryor v. Municipal Court, 599 P.2d 636, 646-47 (Cal. 1979)).
118. Pryor,599 P.2d at 646.
119. Caswell, 758 P.2d at 1053. Thus, "complaints by citizens who have used a certain restroom
that an individual was lingering inside engaging in suggestive conduct-not amounting to an actual
solicitation or indecent exposure-may legitimately give rise to a reasonable inference that the individual harbors the illicit intent." Id. This, the dissenting opinion was quick to note, revealed "one of the
ways in which this vague statute can be-and probably is-misused." Id. at 1059 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1060 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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social undesirability and the need to suppress will render a person vulnera-

ble to prosecution."' For judges who lack empathy and lack any desire
to understand the different life experiences of the objects of their judging,
such a decision confirms the tendency of "sex" law to give with one band
and take away with the other in matters affecting sexual outsiders.'
Neither Uplinger, Pryor, nor Caswell were decided in a vacuum. The

results in the long line of Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence support the
notion that the state can enforce a duty to control the public conduct of

sexual nonconformists. For my purposes, that line of cases reduces to the
proposition that while the courts have had trouble determining what forms
of private conduct the right of privacy does not protect,'2 the courts
have had no problem determining what forms of public conduct violate

dominant group conduct taboos. Thus, for instance, federal constitutional
privacy rights may not extend to people engaging in open adultery,' 24 to

the consensual viewing of pornographic films in public places, l" or to
fornication."' The Supreme Court has never tired of stressing that the

121. "[Vjagrancy statutes are useful to the police.... [T]hey are nets making easy the roundup of
so-called undesireables." Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).
122. For a discussion of empathy and moral error in judging, see generally Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1929 (1991).
123. Compare Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (holding that unmarried heterosexuals had a privacy right with respect to private consensual sexual practices) with Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (holding no privacy right to private consensual sexual activity
exists between people of the same sex). The Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence has been subject
to furious criticism from almost every perspective known to man. See, e.g., THOMAS C. GREY, THE
LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALrrY 37 (1983) (detailing the liberal criticism of privacy jurisprudence); Hafen, supra note 26, at 463; Halley, supra note 14, at 351; Allen Ides, Bowers v. Hardwick:
The Enigmatic Fifth Vote and the Reasonableness of Moral Certitude, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 93,
99-105 (1992); Donald E. Lively, Equal Protection and Moral Circumstance:Accounting for Constitutional Basics, 59 FORD. L. REv. 485, 485-92 (1991); Sandel, supra note 26, at 521 (citing the Conference on Community, Law and Moral Reasoning); Thomas, supra note 47, at 1431.
124. See Martin J. Siegel, For Better or Worse: Adultery, Crime and the Constitution, 30 J. FAM.
L. 45, 58-86 (1991-92) (discussing the current state of the law and arguing for the extension of constitutional protections for adulterous conduct); Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictionson Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1660, 1674-78 (1991) (arguing that statutes criminalizing adultery are unconstitutional).
125. Compare Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-66 (1973) (holding no privacy right
exists to view obscene materials in a public movie house) with Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568
(1969) (reversing a conviction for possession of obscene material in home). I note, but take no position in this article on, the question of pornography and the necessity of its regulation as conduct and
not speech. Those issues, subtle and complex, lie outside the scope of this article. See generally Cathaine A. MacKinnon, Pornographyas Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. REV. 793 (1991)
(discussing pornography and the necessity of its regulation).
126. The "means for achieving the same basic purpose of protecting marital fidelity are available
to Connecticut without the need to 'invade the area of protected freedoms.' "Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307
(1964)); see also Note, supra note 124, at 1663-71 (noting that the Supreme Court has never ruled on
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state has a legitimate interest in advancing the moral welfare of its citizenry and protecting public decency.'27
Equally troublesome is that solicitation statutes are not the only means
by which the power of the state is employed to keep sexual nonconformists out of sight. For instance, the state has used loitering statutes to round
up undesirables-people who offend the public decency (the meaning of
which remains unchanged even after the decriminalization of private consensual nonconformist sexual conduct).' 28 Through such roundups, the
state may make sexual nonconformists yet again invisible by hiding them
from public view.129 Additionally, in a number of jurisdictions, state licensing statutes authorize the closing of the few public meeting places
open to sexual nonconformists. Thus, especially before the 1970s, a number of states effectively kept tight control on gay bars by threatening to
revoke bar owners' liquor licenses where the existence of the nature of the
bar's patrons became notorious. 30 More pernicious, perhaps, is the growing use of newly enacted sexual battery statutes to control nonconformist
3
sexual conduct.1 1
Unfortunately, then, the problem of solicitation and the stark rendering
of the public/private distinction peculiarly applicable to sexual nonconfor-

the issue, but arguing that in light of current privacy jurisprudence, fornication ought to be constitutionally protected).
127. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (noting that law is based on notions of morality);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) (noting that a state has the authority to "maintain a decent society"). For a discussion of the federal courts' acceptance of the legitimacy of the use of the
police power to provide for the public morality, see D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes
and State Enforcement of Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 86-91.
128. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).
129. See Bell, supra note 15, at 97-114; Project, supra note 90, at 664-68. This marginalizing (in
quite the literal sense) use of loitering law has been applied to African-Americans and former criminals, as well as gay men and lesbians. See William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70
YALE L.J. 1, 7-14 (1960); Forrest W. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1203, 1218-19 (1953); Gary V. Dubin & Richard H. Robinson, Note, The Vagrancy
Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality,37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102, 128-33
(1962).
130. See, e.g., Project, supra note 90, at 725-34 (discussing the methods used by police and state
licensing agencies against the owners of establishments in which sexual nonconformists congregated).
A more comprehensive view of this strategy for control of the public space lies outside the scope of
this article. For a dated but fairly thorough review of the law in this regard, see M.J. Greene, Annotation, Sale of Liquor to Homosexuals or Permitting Their Congregation at Licensed Premises as
Groundfor Suspension or Revocation of Liquor License, 27 A.L.R. 3d 1254 (1969); Rosen, supra note
83, at 166-67 (discussing harassment by New York City police at meeting places frequented by homosexuals during the 1960s).
131. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1123B (West Supp. 1995). The Oklahoma statute defines
sexual battery as the "intentional touching, mauling or feeling of the body or private parts of any
person sixteen (16) years of age or older, in a lewd and lascivious manner and without the consent of
that person." Id. Undercover police have arrested people for sexual battery when, in the course of their
decoy work, a target has touched the officers.
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mity (even when the courts have watered down that distinction, as in the
cases discussed) continues to pose a significant threat to both the public

and private existence of sexual nonconformists. These supplementary
modes of control of ostensibly public, and therefore potentially offensive,
conduct, constitute a greater threat than the old sodomy statutes. Like a
Damoclean Sword, the potential for separation and the possibility of a
more sharpened view of difference constantly hangs over the head of those
who believe that substantial public progress is being made in opening the

public sphere.'

As long as offense, and particularly moral offense, re-

mains a legitimate source of governmental power to regulate, no decision

of any court will truly liberate sexual nonconformists from the darkness of
the private spaces the government and society have assigned them. For
this reason, some commentators have turned away from the allure of balancing the relative rights of parties toward the security of boundaries and
bright line rules for protecting the habits, inclinations, and identity of
nonconformists.'33
VI. WHAT WE REALLY PREACH

The touchstone of decriminalization-of toleration on a broader
plane-is public offense. Neither the Wolfenden Report nor the Model
Penal Code sought to soften or devalue the state's interest in permitting
the punishment of morally offensive conduct. The only concession is to
limit punishment of moral offenses under the criminal law to public manifestations of such conduct. As long as one concealed one's nonconformity
from every member of the dominant group, one's conduct was private and
inoffensive; otherwise, one's conduct could be branded public and punished. The liberal canon, therefore, preserves, substantially undisturbed,
the core traditional purpose of morals legislation-the restraint of official

(public) conduct both sinful and, on that basis, irredeemably offensive."

132. Indeed, as the Caswell case demonstrates, the sword occasionally has fallen even in the most
"progressive" of states. Caswell, 758 P.2d at 1046-47. It is even easier for the sword to fall in states
where sodomy remains a criminal offense. In those states, the courts have had little problem upholding
solicitation statutes on the basis of the criminality of the conduct being solicited. See, e.g., Pedersen v.
City of Richmond, 254 S.E.2d 95, 98-99 (Va. 1979) (sustaining conviction of defendant charged with
sodomy).
133. See Dalton, supra note 25, at 881, 900 ("But flexibility is purchased at a price--namely
highly unpredictable outcomes. Because Feinberg cares very much about substantive outcomes, and
seeks principles that will assist legislatures to draft morally justified penal laws, the indeterminacy of
his scheme [based on the balancing of a nuisance model] ought to give him fits.... I would therefore
rather cast my lot with privacy/property analysis, and the safety of a well-marked border."). Of course,
this well-marked border may enclose an especially small area. Ironically, that is also the thrust of the
Model Penal Code and Wolfenden formulations; which limit nonconformists to the publicly nonexistent world of the closet.
134. See Henkin, supra note 25, at 392-95; Schwartz, supra note 99, at 670.
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The difference between the liberal canon, which gives free rein to
inclination to suppress immoral (nondominant group) conduct, and the
conservative canon is merely one of degree.'35 Traditionalists are equally
offended by both public and private conduct.' 36 Liberals are not. The distinctions between public and private expression of sexual nonconformity
under the Model Penal Code and the Wolfenden Report represent "nothing
but differences in the intensity of the aversion with which the different
kinds of behavior are regarded."' 37 Liberals are able to make a distinction between public and private conduct, and they can justify different
treatment of each based upon practicality and expediency considerations.'38 They do not justify the protection for private conduct because
that conduct is good. For conservatives the inability to concede that the
conduct is "good" makes it difficult to justify different treatment of public
conduct based on economic considerations.
Let us examine this aversion more closely. The aversion is twofold.
First, the conduct itself produces an aversion. To that aversion, the
Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code suggest that aversion alone
is insufficient to criminalize the nonconformity, absent other aggravating
factors.' 39 The second aversion is to the appearance, whether public or
private, of condoning or approving either the conduct of sexual nonconformity or sexual nonconformity as a state-of-being. The second aversion
feeds on a fundamental unwillingness to empathize with the object of
toleration."4 To that aversion, and to disinterest in empathy, both the

135. Compare the difference between the voice of the liberal canon and that of the traditionalist.
For the traditionalist, "[tlhe prevention of a sinful act is good, both for the society at large and for the
individual who refrains, even if such restraint is merely external, having been produced by the fear of
punishment, and produces no change in the human heart." David M. Smolin, The Enforcement of
Natural Law by the State: A Response to ProfessorCalhoun, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 381, 402 (1991).
The liberal canon would give greater latitude to individual freedom of choice at the margin-in matters of private morality, privately practiced. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, paras. 61-62;
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 371-72 (1980). Everything else is potentially punishable, not
merely as an affront to moral and aesthetic sensibilities, but as a nuisance punishable under the laws of
society. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 49; MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2, at 476
(1980). Is there really much difference between the two? I believe there is not.
136. See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 135, at 402.
137. Schwartz, supra note 99, at 675 (attempting to explain why some conduct was punishable
whether or not public, such as desecration of a corpse, and some only when public, such as sodomy,
under the Model Penal Code).
138. See id. at 676.
139. See THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 61; MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2,
at 371-72 (1980).
140. "There is actually a body of emerging writing that says empathy only goes so far, that we
cannot identify with or love anyone who is too different from us, cannot resonate to a 'story' too
unlike the one we usually hear." Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle: Care, Competition, and
the Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 81 CAL. L. REV. 387, 413 (1993) (reviewing ANDREW HACKER,
Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992)).
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Model Penal Code and Wolfenden Report have given free rein. '"The
conviction that homosexual conduct is 'bad' quickly translates into the
conclusion that it therefore should be punished, and there is a correspond-

ing fear that removing criminal sanctions would amount to implied endorsement
of a kind of behavior that majoritarian sentiment finds abhor141
rent.'

As long as sexual nonconformity is hidden, it need not appear to exist.
Public existence poses a problem for a dominant culture whose mores
compel suppression of the nonconformity tolerated. If the dominant culture
cannot, with the complicity of the object of their toleration, pretend that

sexual nonconformity does not exist, then that very nonconformity becomes a threat to the dominant culture. Traditionalists have long recognized this, and, as a consequence, have declared war on all nonconformity.142 By contrast, liberals compromise, dissatisfied with tradition but
unwilling to embrace the alternatives.

Moreover, for marginalized groups to take control of their identity and
pursue public recognition of a positive self-identity is a danger for a dominant culture built, in some measure, on the notion that there is value,
especially an economic value, in conformity. 143 Control of identity is
141. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 366 (1980). Indeed, this aversion to appearing to
approve the conduct or lifestyle of sexual nonconformists plays a significant role even in the reticence
of legislatures to decriminalize even private adult consensual sexual activity. This appearance of approval had been a fear of a large group of the Model Penal Code Advisory Committee who had opposed decriminalization of private acts of "deviate sexual intercourse." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2
cmt. 2, at 372 (1980). Those opposed to decriminalization "thought that the Reporters' recommendation was rationally correct, but feared that failure to make a concession to violent emotional hostility
among legislators and the public at large might jeopardize acceptance of the Model Penal Code as a
whole." Id. That fear had been the reason why Texas originally refused to decriminalize private acts of
sodomy. See Von Beitel, supra note 3, at 44-46. The same fear permeates the public debate over the
inclusion of noncloseted gay men and lesbians into the armed forces. See, e.g., Judith H. Steihm, Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion Policy: Text and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 685, 69195 (1992). It suffused the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In that regard, see
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1638-49 (1987). Cf. Delgado &
Stefancic, supra note 122, at 1929 (noting the inability of the judiciary to identify with litigants who
are too "different" from them, and the effects of this perception of difference on litigation).
142. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 26, at 10-11, 110-26.
143. For a discussion of dominant group identity as property in the context of race, see Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1715-45 (1993). Professor Harris argues that
there exists a set of assumptions, privileges, and benefits that accompanies the status of being white
which has become a valuable asset, akin to property rights, which whites have sought to protect. Id. at
1713. The conflation of race and property have made it possible for historical forms of domination to
evolve to reproduce subordination in the present. Id. at 1758; see also Julianne Malveaux, GenderDifference and Beyond: An Economic Perspective on Diversity and Commonality Among Women, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SExuAL DIFFERENCE 226, 227-38 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) (arguing
that feminism theory and policy should consider differences in race, class, and family circumstances
among women). In a similar vein, Professor Alan Freeman has argued that civil rights law creates a
facade of racial fairness that facilitates continuing white domination. See Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doc-
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thus a conscious act of the controlling group, critical for setting the acceptable parameters of the toleration of nonconforming conduct. The importance of the power to control image is conscious. Consider what was
important to the people considering the decriminalization of sodomy in
Texas:
The second concern of Committee members favoring
criminalization of these acts dealt with keeping the homosexuallyoriented person in his or her place and out of the public sight.
These Committee members were concerned that if the private
homosexual acts of consenting adults were decriminalized, then
the gay subculture would become increasingly more visible-to
the aesthetic discomfort of the heterosexual majority-which could
no longer deny the existence of the massive and pervasive gay
segment of society. 1"
Perhaps the Texas legislators of the 1970s were right. Certainly they
were right to believe that allowing any kind of positive public identity
could seriously erode the dominant group's power to marginalize its nonconformists and to use nausea as a means of covert suppression. By bidding for public approval, nonconformity may become respectable. Respectability reduces the dominant group's ability to express its revulsion
through the agency of the criminal law. Respectability is a consequence to
be avoided; it is a proxy for political power.'45 Thus, for example, the

trine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1050-52 (1978). Derrick Bell has argued that the structures of racial
domination have remained intact from the days before the abolition of slavery in the United States.
Consequently, moral and legal advances toward social justice in racial matters are no more than manifestations of white self-interest. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992);
Derrick Bell, Fonvard: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CAL. L. REV. 597, 602-11 (1991). This notion
may also have a certain force in the context of sexual nonconformity. See Von Beitel, supra note 3, at
45 (explaining that the Texas Bar Penal Code Revision Committee wanted to continue the
criminalization of sodomy, in part, to preserve the economic power of sexual conformists). The author
explained: "This factor of employment discrimination is very important in explaining why some members wanted these acts criminalized, since the criminalization of the private homosexual acts of consenting adults is a means of precluding a cause of action arising out of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in employment." Id.
144. Von Beitel, supra note 3, at 44-45. Mr. Von Beitel also explained that those who favored
criminalization feared that decriminalization would result in greater public displays of disapproved
conduct, and as such, the "crime rate" would increase. Id. at 43.
145. Professor Louis Schwartz has addressed how this political power might be gained:
I do not mean to suggest a particular percentage test of substantial unanimity. It is rather a
matter of when an ancient and unquestioned tenet has become seriously debateable in a
given community. This may happen when it is discovered that a substantial, although inarticulate, segment of the population has drifted away from the old belief. It may happen
when smaller numbers of articulate opinion-makers launch an open attack on the old ethic.
When this kind of beach-head has been established in the hostile country of traditional
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power of dominant culture to impose on lesbians the images of "predatory,
possessive, promiscuous, jealous, sadistic, masochistic, unhealthy, bitter,
man-hating, masculine, aggressive, frustrated, over-sexed" people 46' is
the power to effect legal results on the basis of this negative image in
matters ranging from child custody to employment. 47
Liberal toleration, therefore, permits the dominant culture to maintain
control of the image and identity of sexual nonconformists. Dominant

culture will use whatever is handy to advantage its image control. Consider AIDS'48 in this regard. Dominant culture has managed to use AIDS to

craft an image of gay men as something apart-as a group whose sexual
conduct condemns them to difference and death.' 49 In a manner of

faith, then, and only then, can we expect constitutional principles to restrain the fifty-one
percent majority from suppressing the public flouting of deeply held moral views.
Schwartz, supra note 99, at 672; cf. Deborah H. Rhode, Definitions of Difference, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 143, at 197, 212 ("Disputes over abstract legal
principles can divert energy from concrete political struggles, and incremental reforms can deflect
attention from the more basic economic and social problems that remain."). This notion has been echoed in recent judicial opinions, particularly those refusing to limit the power of the state to criminalize
sodomy on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. 1986) (holding
that classification based on sexual preference constitutionally permissible). The irony, of course, is that
illegality may create uncontrollability. Like the trade in liquor during the period of Prohibition in this
country, the suppression of sexual nonconformity makes it impossible for the state to govern and regulate the nonconformists. See infra note 175.
146. Anne B. Goldstein, Representing Lesbians, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 301, 302 (1992).
147. Halley, supra note 2, at 947-61; Law, supra note 60, at 186-96.
148. AIDS is an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, and is evidenced by the
presence of antibodies to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in the blood. BLACK'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 18 (35th ed. 1987).
149. See, e.g., ROGER J.MAGNUSON, ARE GAY RIGHTS RIGHT?: MAKING SENSE OF THE CONTROVERSY 47-54 (1990). This is primarily the case in the area of insurance. See, e.g., Clifford & luculano,
supra note 8, at 1806-08. Indeed, the dominant culture of late appears interested in gay men primarily
in connection with AIDS. Thus, American cinema (even with good intentions) tends to portray gay
men as touched by the tragedy of AIDS. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA (Tri-Star Pictures 1994). This, of
course, is not to trivialize that tragedy-the point, however, is that gay men are viewed almost exclusively through the prism of that disease to differentiate and isolate gay men from dominant heterosexual society. When sexual nonconformists are not portrayed as touched by AIDS, they are invariably
portrayed as somewhat deranged and threatening. See, e.g., BASIC INSTINCT (Tri-Star Pictures 1992)
(telling a story about a woman with lesbian tendencies who is compelled to murder heterosexual men).
Interestingly enough, while female sexuality in pictures such as this is threatening, heterosexual cravings, even when overheated, are perfectly acceptable traits for social heroes. "Gay and lesbian organizations have been protesting the film [Basic Instinct] because all of the bad guys are bisexuals, but the
truth is, all of the bad guys are women.... Our villains are prowling harpies who can't be trusted,
while our hero is a violence-prone man who can't keep his rocket in his pocket long enough to solve
the crimes." Karla Peterson, Basically, "Instinct" Is Disturbing Thriller, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRHI.,
Mar. 21, 1992, at E5. Otherwise, they provide the comic element in light-hearted comedies. See, e.g.,
LA CAGE AUX FOLLES (Dama Producione and Les Productions Articles Associates 1978) (portraying a
gay male couple raising a heterosexual son of one of the partners). As one reviewer noted, "There's
nothing like homosexuality for still raising hackles among large sectors of straight middle- and upperclass society.... Fierstein knows that pounding the table for gay rights will send them up the aisles.
Wrap it in a musical, with music and lyrics by that supreme middlebrow, Jerry Herman, and they'll
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speaking, the accommodationist approach of liberal toleration might well
have facilitated the use of AIDS by the dominant culture to transform gay
men into our modern equivalent of premodern lepers and syphilitics. 5 '
The aversion to the conduct "decriminalized" through the model of
toleration implicit in the Model Penal Code and Wolfenden Report finds
official expression in the law itself. Statutes continue to speak the language of moral opprobrium, emphasizing the official image of sexual
nonconformists, whose private conduct has been decriminalized, as disapproved. Liberal toleration borrows heavily from the traditionalist approach
it seeks to supplant; there is a strong tie between the traditional means of
identifying nonconformists' sexual acts--detestable and abominable crimes
against nature-and crimes, the identity of which is dependant upon an
opprobrious characterization.'
There is, therefore, some measure of truth to arguments that
"[p]ervasive prejudice, unfounded stereotypes, and invidious public and
private discrimination severely victimize gay males and lesbians in the
United States .... State and federal institutions ...are prime instigators
and facilitators of this invidious discrimination."'52 Such discrimination
is the payment society will continue to extract for its official decriminalization of private sexual acts. This "deal" works well for society, but it
provides little to its supposed beneficiaries.' 53 The deal ensures that all

hum along." Robert Koehler, Stage Review; An Overblown "Cage Aux Folles" in Long Beach, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1988, pt. 6, at 3.
150. Thus, for instance, the repeated calls, dutifully reported in the popular press, for mandatory
testing for the HIV antibody (to identify sexual nonconformists) or the isolation of gay men in order to
control this new disease, or both. See, e.g., DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALrrY 479 (1988) (describing the calls to isolate, quarantine, or even tattoo people exposed to the
HIV virus). On the responses of Western European society to syphilis during the Renaissance, see
generally Bruce T. Boehrer, Early Modern Syphilis, in FORBIDDEN HISTORY: THE STATE, SOCIETY,
AND THE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY IN MODERN EUROPE 11 (John C. Fout ed., 1992). Sylvia Law
has noted that AIDS has simultaneously increased (1) awareness of "homosexuality," and (2) compassion for those afflicted with AIDS, and (3) disapproval and public fear of sexual nonconformists. Law,
supra note 60, at 194-95; accord GREENBERG, supra, at 478-81.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 85-92.
152. John Charles Hayes, Note, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal ProtectionScrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REV. 375,
375 (1990).
153. The ban on private conduct is difficult and expensive to enforce, and does little to inhibit
such conduct. This is the thrust of the rationale supporting decriminalization of sodomy in the Model
Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 370-71 (1980). But see David L. Shapiro,
Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 532 (1988) (stating that movement to decriminalize private consensual acts of sodomy "cannot be explained simply in terms of a decision
about the best uses of limited judicial and prosecutorial resources; the arguments for decriminalization
emphasize the inherent value of individual autonomy in matters of choice"). But any public manifestation of the desire for or the positive expression of any facet of sexual nonconformity is a "public nuisance." See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2, at 476 (1980). The boogeyman is "indiscriminate solicitation in public streets, parks, and transportation facilities [which] is not only an affront to
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of the constitutional due process and equal protection analysis in the
world5' will contribute little to the ability of sexual nonconformists to
come out of their societally imposed hiding places. The elimination of the
sodomy laws and other legal proscriptions on private sexual nonconformity grants society the authority to continue to publicly suppress the idea of
sexual nonconformity, permits the use of the law to express public nausea
with conduct tolerated, and creates an official state policy the implications

of which are that it is proper to treat sexual nonconformists as people
whose public existence amounts to little more than a public nuisance.
Indeed, some have argued that this form of liberal toleration has en-

abled dominant society to marshall basic constitutional protections, such as
the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression, as a vehicle for
the vilification of nondominant groups. 5' The better view, I believe, is
that freedom of expression provides a means of vilification only because
those vilified have abandoned the field. This, perhaps, is the most ironic
part of the deal which liberal toleration, that of the Model Penal Code

variety, has extracted from sexual nonconformists. Liberal toleration works
only through and to the extent of the complicity of those tolerated. "It is a
truism in the gay and lesbian communities that such self-identified heterosexuals [who totally deny the importance of their own homosexual desires

and behavior], in order to maintain their counterfactual denial of their own
homoerotic experience,
zealously foment the very stigma they are so con56
cerned to avoid."'
Much like the dust in the parable (and what is the dust; certainly the

moral and aesthetic sensibilities; it is also a source of annoyance to, and harassment of, members of
the public who do not wish to become involved." Id. Such conduct is easy to police and control--and
ensures that even tolerated conduct remains private and hidden from view; permitting society the luxury of believing it does not exist. Apparently, though, the deal is not reciprocal-annoyance to and
harassment of sexual nonconformists by people representing the dominant view is not perceived as an
equivalent nuisance, worthy of suppression. That is the ever present problem of balancing at the core
of our notions of nuisance-and in the balancing, the weight of the disgust of the majority, it would
seem, might always overpower that of the minority.
154. And there has been an abundance of this type of analysis over the last 30 years, and especially after Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 45, at 341-50;
Goldstein, supra note 14, at 1081-87; Nan B. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 531, 531-54 (1992); Ides, supra note 123, at 93; Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE
LJ. 1493, 1493 (1988) (giving a republican critique of Bowers v. Hardwick); Thomas B. Stoddard,
Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection,54 U. CHi. L. REv. 648, 648-56 (1987).
155. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 114, at 1284-88 (explaining that a free market of racial
depiction resists change because the dominant-group-generated pictures of the subordinated group are
usually negative, and that these negative pictures are internalized by both the dominant and the subordinated group, creating an atmosphere in which, when the subordinated group attempts to speak, they
have little credibility); Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the
Subordinationof Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 95, 95 (stating that "[t]he freedom of expression is the
freedom to contribute to the social definition of other people").
156. Halley, supra note 2, at 946.
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creature has never figured that out, and it is not clear that the dust has),
those who cooperate in their own oblivion can, in some measure, blame
themselves for the resulting oblivion. Indeed, the creature tends to rouse
itself only when what it considers dust shows itself in space the creature
has taken on for itself. It is only that which becomes public in this fashion
that exists, that can demand attention, and that can maintain its right to the
use of societal space. This grabbing of some part of the public space may
be the most significant legacy of Stonewall. The active self-consciousness
of sexual nonconformists which grew substantially after 1969 represents
the intrusion of sexual nonconformists directly into the dialogue with the
dominant society respecting both its space and its image.' However,
twenty-five years has brought only tentative steps and partial recognition.
For the moment, the vision of the Model Penal Code and the Wolfenden
Report, based on a dialogue by dominant heterosexual society with itself,
will continue to be imposed on those for whose good this dialogue has
allegedly occurred.
VII. AN ENDING BUT NOT A CONCLUSION
Abandoning direct suppression does not imply tolerance, certainly not
positive tolerance. That sexual nonconformity is no longer actively suppressed is a mark of the indecisiveness of the sexually dominant group in
America respecting the acceptability of the types of sexual conduct practiced (now more openly) between people of the same sex as well as between people of different sexes. Even the authors of the Wolfenden Report
recognized that their conclusions were possible only in a world of cultural
conduct-norm indecisiveness, "for on the matters with which we are called
upon to deal we have not succeeded in discovering an unequivocal 'public
opinion.' ""' The drafters of the Model Penal Code also based their toleration of private conduct on the inability to find consensus about how society ought to treat the problem of sexual nonconformity.'59 Ironically,
by affirming the power to use the state to affirm dominant sexual conduct
mores, our forms of toleration imply its opposite.
[T]he freedom to despise our fellows may be a liberty which is
entitled to protection, but when this freedom is exercised conspira-

157. Thus, gay men and lesbians have begun to attempt to take control of the agenda of the manner in which their existence poses a problem for dominant society, and what is to be done about it.
See, e.g., MOHR,supra note 5, at 315-17 (suggesting a strategy for gay and lesbian activism). This
attempt to obtain even partial control of identity has been significant enough to require both recognition and refutation by the dominant culture. See, e.g., Magnuson, supra note 149, at 9-19, 37-62.
158. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9,para. 16.
159. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 367-69 (1980).
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torially by the community, powerful sanctions are unleashed which
are just as capable of destroying individual freedom as any sanctions of law or economics. The creativity of the individual is as
effectively quashed by the hatred, contempt and rejection of the

community as by a jail sentence or the loss of a job."e°

Liberal toleration and sexual liberation of the contemporary liberal
variety steals the power of identity from the beneficiaries of its benefi-

cence.16 t It preserves, in the dominant society, the power to create identity. Dominant culture dictates the existence of groups; having constructed

them ("us" and "them"), it then creates the descriptive differences between
the "us" and "them" created. Dominant culture explains as fact that sexual
nonconformists are sinful, 62 are sick, 63 or are otherwise not the equal

of normal folk."6 Dominant culture takes for itself the power to describe
the characteristics of these groups, where they live and what they do. 6
This is as destructive as the threat of any criminal punishment for mere
conduct. The supreme irony, of course, is that the victims of this toleration

cheerily (through increasingly less so) participate in this theater of the
absurd. "The transformation of silence into language and action is an act

160. Carrington, supra note 25, at 580 (addressing the context of rehabilitative versus deterrence
models of criminal law).
161. For an excellent analysis of the social construction of sexual identity, and the imposition of a
persona of identifiable and subordinated characteristics on sexual nonconformists, see MICHEL
FOUCAULT, HIsToRY OF SEXUALrrY (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon Books 1978) (1976);
GREENBERG, supra note 150 (giving a sociological explanation of the construction of the notion of
homosexuality). For a discussion on the social construction of a gay or lesbian identity by the dominant culture and its imposition on those so characterized in the United States, see Fajer, supra note 3,
at 512-15 and Halley, supra note 2, at 916 n.5. Cf. PErER L. BERGER & THoMAS LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALrTY 5 (1966) (arguing that "reality is socially constructed and that the
sociology of knowledge must analyze the processes in which this occurs").
162. MOBERLY, supra note 26, at 27-39. The acceptance of the identity of sexual nonconformists
as sinful, moral reprobates, explains in some small way the reluctance by African-American and Hispanic community leaders and institutions to more forcefully respond to the AIDS epidemic among
people of color. For a discussion of this issue, which lies outside the scope of this article, see Paula C.
Johnson, Silence Equals Death: The Response to AIDS Within Communities of Color, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1075, 1079-81.
163. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 150, at 397-433; POSNER, supra note 45, at 21-23, 53-54.
164. Law, supra note 60, at 192-93 ("Most Americans believe that homosexuals lead unhappy and
insecure lives."); Timothy W. Reinig, Comment, Sin, Stigma and Society: A Critique of Morality and
Values in DemocraticLaw and Policy, 38 BuFF. L. REv. 859, 884-92 (1990).
165. Thus, the picture of the average homosexual: he lives in large cities, prefers interior design,
hair styling and the arts as occupation, prefers to stay with his own kind, is intelligent, quirky, neurotic, fashion conscious, and exhibits the mannerisms adopted by women in Western society. See KLING,
supra note 88, at 102-03; POSNER, supra note 45, at 300-07. But see Dalton, supra note 25, at 903-05
(arguing that permitting a dominant group to define and punish disgusting behavior poses an unacceptable risk of cultural domination); Law, supra note 60,at 188-96 (discussing the ways in which dominant culture condemns homosexuals more harshly than it condemns heterosexuals for the same sexual
acts).
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of self-revelation, and is therefore dangerous; however, the alternative,
remaining
silent, is more dangerous, and eventually on some level, deadly. ''116
In this manner the Wolfenden Report's brand of toleration has brought
a large measure of protection against direct coercion by the criminal law,
but the Report has done so at an extraordinary price. It cripples the ability
of people who do not identify with the sexual moral traditions of the
majority of Americans (and whose conduct may violate the conduct taboos
of this group) to enjoy something even approaching equivalent status. In
the guise of limiting the reach of the criminal law in matters of certain
forms of overt sexual conduct regarded as private, the (so-called) liberal
state of the last several generations continues to use its power, overtly and
covertly, to enforce the notion that the conduct protected (in private) is
wrong, awful, disgusting, and not indulged in by normal people. 67
The contradiction, the dysfunction, the power to give with one hand
(and feel good about it) and take away with the other (and feel safe) is all
too clear.'68 The contradiction permits consensual sexual activity between
people irrespective of the sex or marital status of the participants, but
punishes, in a sometimes severe and humiliating way, any public expres-

166. Angela Gilmore, It Is Better to Speak, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 74, 80 (1990-91).
167. Two dated, but telling examples: In the first, the state of Ohio refused to permit the incorporation of a gay organization on the grounds that "promotion of homosexuality as a valid life style is
contrary to the public policy" of Ohio, despite the fact that Ohio had previously eliminated its sodomy
laws. State v. Brown, 313 N.E.2d 847, 848 (Ohio 1974). In the second, James McConnell sued to
require the state of Minnesota to issue a marriage license to him and his partner. Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the state was not required to
issue a marriage license except for heterosexual unions. Id. at 187. Thereafter, the University of Minnesota refused to hire Mr. McConnell as a librarian because of the notoriety of the same sex marriage
case. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 814 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972). Reversing the district court, the Eighth Circuit held that the
University of Minnesota could refuse to hire Mr. McConnell on that ground, McConnell v. Anderson,
451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972), while not disagreeing with the
district court that to justify dismissal from public employment "it must be shown that there is an observable and reasonable relationship between efficiency in the job and homosexuality." McConnell,
316 F. Supp. at 814. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Mr. McConnell had been denied a job for a
perfectly good reason unrelated to his private homosexual inclinations. McConnell, 451 F.2d at 196.
McConnell's public behavior-that is, the bringing of the lawsuit itself--constituted an attempt to
force his potential employers to approve his homosexuality. Id. According to the court, by making his
sexual orientation public, he placed his employer in the position of tacitly approving his "right to
pursue an activist role in implementing his unconventional ideas concerning the societal status to be
accorded homosexuals." Id. at 196. What appears to be a blatantly manipulative and "small" opinion,
is really nothing more than the natural consequence of a philosophy that prides itself on a toleration of
shame.
168. This contradiction, of course, is not limited to the sexual sphere. Thus, we are good at integrating our schools, but at the same time placing students, other than those of color, in special "advanced" classes, the net result of which is to separate (now within each school, rather than between
schools) those which were at least theoretically brought together. As with sexual matters, consciousness of the contradiction can, at times, be explosive.
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sion of even the most benign form of same-sex conduct. Thus, the liberal
canon would permit private consensual sexual activity between people of

the same sex,'69 but would suppress the open display of any physical attachment between people of the same sex170 as well as the solicitation of
any such consensual activity in a public place or the mere public congregation of people who may be amenable to such conduct in any public
place, such as a park or a bar."' Having given sexual nonconformists
some private space, the dominant culture has defined its opposite, public
space, so broadly as to substantially preserve its power to control nonconformist sexual expression.' Nonmajority sexual conduct of certain
types may occur, we are happily reassured, but only in private, and only if
the acts-including their solicitation-can literally and figuratively be
hidden from view (so that the rest of us can pretend they do not exist).

Liberal toleration instructs us that society ought not punish the commission of certain acts but ought to remain free to make indulgence in
such acts difficult when such acts are believed (by the state, or those in

control of the mechanisms thereof) to offend or contradict public (or publicly adopted) sexual conduct norms, norms for which society has reserved
the code phrase "moral."' The jurisprudence of the European Court of

169. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 362-63 (1980) ("Section 213.2 of the Model
Code makes a fundamental departure from prior law in excepting from criminal sanctions deviate
sexual intercourse between consenting adults.").
170. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.1 (1980) ("A person commits a petty misdemeanor if he does any
lewd act which he knows is likely to be observed by others who would be affronted or alarmed.").
The commentaries to this section indicate that the purpose of this statute is to punish "the open flouting of community standards regarding sexual and related matters." MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.1 cmt.
1, at 448 (1980).
171. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 (1980) ("A person is guilty of a petty misdemeanor if he
loiters in or near any public place for the purpose of soliciting or being solicited to engage in deviate
sexual relations."). Oblivious to the contradictory nature of its statement, the commentary to § 251.3
explains, "The rationale for retaining this offense is not the regulation of private morality but the suppression of a public nuisance. Persons who publicly seek or make themselves available for deviate
sexual relations openly flout community standards." MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 cmt. 2, at 476; see
also supra note 36 (commenting that liberal reforms in some jurisdictions have not created a more
permissive environment for nonconforming sexual behavior). For an earlier discussion of the use of
solicitation statutes to defeat sexually expressive rights, see Bell, supra note 15, at 97-114. Mare
Fajer's stories of the invisibility of sexual nonconformists and the dangers of public life are also instructive. See Fajer, supra note 3, at 571-75.
172. Certainly, dominant culture definitions of public spaces can be substantially different from
those of others. While public in the sense of the dominant culture, the places described are quite private in fact, at least to those who do not care to participate. See, e.g., HUMPHREYS, supra note 41, at
1-15; Project,supra note 90, at 795-96 (describing the private nature of public solicitation).
173. For a discussion of the use of the term "morality," and its evolution over the last two centuries in Europe and North America, see Randolph Trumbach, Sex, Gender, and Sexual Identity in Modem Culture: Male Sodomy and Female Prostitutionin Enlightenment England, reprint in FORBIDDEN
HISTORY: THE STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY IN MODERN EUROPE, supra
note 150, at 89, 89-106 (originally appearing in 2 J. HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1991)); Dalton, supra
note 25, at 881. For a discussion of notions of morality and emotional reactions to conduct, see
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Human Rights, the supreme judicial tribunal under the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, is no different." The result is that our traditional systems and attitudes can be preserved intact, without the messiness of social guilt and merely at the cost
of creating a more subtle form of punishment for violation.'75 This form
of punishment, mostly in the form of indirect conduct coercion, will ultimately be more debilitating than the older, cruder, and more direct traditional control of sexual conduct.'76 Thus, we come face to face with the
fundamental intolerance of our system of tolerating sexual nonconformity.
It is a tolerance at once medieval and corporate.'77 It has the character of
the dhimmi of the Islamic world.' However, one need not search for

DWORKIN, supra note 34, at 248-53.
174. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention sets out the right of people "to
respect for [their] private and family [lives]," Convention, art. 8(1), 222 U.N.T.S. at 230, but limits
this right by state interests in the protection of morals. Convention art. 8(2), 222 U.N.T.S. at 230;
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976) (holding that states are permitted a wide degree of discretion in legislating to protect the morality of their citizens). The rights of
sexual nonconformists are private rights; they are rights which end at the point that the window shades
are open, or the public is permitted to become conscious of the act. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981); Laurence R. Helfer, Note, Finding a Consensus on Equality: The Homosexual Age of Consent and the European Convention on Human Rights, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1044, 1054-62 (1990). On the internationalization of human rights, see M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and
Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 243-51 (1993)
and Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REv. I 110,
1127-47 (1982).
175. When viewed in its proper context, then, it is puzzling that traditionalists expended such
energy in opposition to the basic teachings of the liberal canon. See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 26, at
463; Smolin, supra note 135, at 381. The Wolfenden Report, after all, affirms the existence and power
of traditional public morality and the right of the state to enforce that morality in public. See THE
WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 9, para. 49.
176. This notion is becoming increasingly recognized. See, e.g., MOHR, supra note 5, at 54-57;
Fajer, supra note 3, at 570-602 (discussing the concealment of gay life by nongay society and its costs
to the people who are not permitted to join public society). Traditionally, public expression of sexual
nonconformity was the easiest way to control deviates. See KLING, supra note 88, at 117 ("The vast
majority of homosexuals are tried for 'soliciting males to perform lewd and indecent acts.' "); Project,
supra note 90, at 657-67.
177. On the rise of the corporatist treatment of nondominant groups within society, especially in
non-European and North American societies, see generally Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and
the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993). Feminist essentialism has been criticized
for treating individualism as "an unfashionable, if not reactionary, detraction from progressive social
theory." Maia Ettinger, Color Me Queer: An Aesthetic Challenge to Feminist Essentialism, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 106, 107 (1993). For a critical discussion of essentialism, see, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 590-607 (1990). But see
Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of
Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1990) (supporting feminist theory which acknowledges
women's gender differences). The debate over the value of gender difference theory is beyond the
scope of this article, and by its reference here I do not intend to take a position on that debate.
178. For a discussion of the nature of the relationship between true believers and infidels devel-
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the model in the lands of Islam; western history provides a number of
analogous models for our toleration of sexual nonconformists.179 Our
toleration accepts the inability to completely extirpate conduct which the
dominant group reviles (and in this appears tolerant) but remains commit-

ted to its marginalization. At its core, it is a toleration designed to emphasize the fundamental inferiority and subservient status of those tolerated and to ensure that members of the dominant group are not tempted to

apostasy.'

'"The community and its members are entirely free to employ

theological teaching, moral suasion, parental advice, psychological and

psychiatric counseling and other noncoercive means to condemn the practice of consensual sodomy.' ' . And, when consensual sodomy is no longer private or discreet, the state itself may intervene to protect against the
threat to the public, "many of
whom would be offended by being exposed
82
to the intimacies of others."'
This closeted, corporate type of toleration is fundamentally illiberal,' though clothed in liberal garb. It is unstable; the history of minorities in Europe, Jewish people, and Gypsies," provides a glimpse of the

oped during the classical period of Islam, see ANTOINE FATITAL, LE STATUT LtGAL DES NONMUSULMANS EN PAYS D'ISLAM (1958). But see, ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC
REFORMATION: Cnm LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990) (searching for
Qur'anic justifications for current notions of international human rights).
179. The corporate treatment of the Jewish population of Europe before the French Revolution
provides, perhaps, the classic example. See, e.g., MAX L. MARGOLIS & ALEXANDER MARX, A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 477-599 (2d ed. 1965). Currently, Europe is creating a new classic situation in the conflict which has marked the disintegration of that twentieth century delusion-the state of
Yugoslavia. See Kenneth Anderson, Illiberal Toleration:An Essay on the Fall of Yugoslavia and the
Rise of Multiculturalism in the United States, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 385, 399-409 (1993) (arguing against
the appeal of a corporatist approach to multi-culturalism in which individual based pluralism is sacrificed for community autonomy and control).
180. Thus, the necessity for the limitations on the dress, manners, and public displays of the faith
of non-Muslims was justified by Hasan al Kafrawi, an Eighteenth Century professor of canon law in
Cairo, on the grounds that such restrictions were required to prevent offense to "the sensibilities of
poor Moslims and in order that their faith in their religion should not be shaken by this." THE JEW IN
THE MEDIEVAL WORLD: A SOURCE BOOK: 315-1791, at 16 (Jacob R. Marcus ed., 1969) (1938). English law since 1988 has prohibited state instutitions from promoting homosexuality or its acceptability
as a family relationship. See Finnis, supra note 33, at 1050.
181. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940 n.3 (N.Y. 1980) (overturning the criminal proscription
of private consensual sodomy).
182. Id. at 941.
183. See Anderson, supra note 179, at 385.
184. For a discussion of the treatment of Jewish people and Gypsies in Europe, see, e.g.,
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST 39 (1989) (discussing the notion in European
society of Jewish people as slime); DONALD KENRICK & GRATrAN PUXON, THE DESTINY OF
EUROPE'S GYPSIES (1972) (describing European ambivalence to the Gypsies, viewing them as either
ethnographic specimens of the "Noble Savage" or as unauthentic half-breeds). The most interesting
thing that emerges from the history is the cyclical character of toleration. Both groups were subject to
the whims of economy, prejudice, and the needs (often ephemeral and unprincipled) of the ruling elite.
The result is a pattern of constant expulsion, resettlement, and expulsion, through all of which no
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future of the toleration of sexual nonconformists. Indeed, the continued
suppression of nonconformist sexual expression, the imperative of nausea
to keep separate, distinct, and subordinate such nonconformists, can be
seen as a necessary means of protecting the social and religious identity of
the dominant group.
Where for any reason a group which highly values its primordial
and/or religious identity comes to fear that that identity might be
expunged, it is like to make the boundaries of that identity increasingly rigid and to perceive boundary-breaking
sexual practic85
es as a threat to the entire social order.1
Sexual nonconformists are useful scapegoats, as an "other" through
which group identity can be defined and preserved. Sexual nonconformists
are foreigners (certainly social foreigners), and not individuals, to be dealt
with as a group of undesirables who society cannot send back from
whence they came. The Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code play
an important role in this effort. Their approach to the criminalization of
expressions of sexual nonconformity epitomizes "the underlying tendencies
of Western culture to retreat from secularism, liberalism, and humanism
into a romanticized past of order, stability, unchanging social roles, and
complete social homogeneity."'86 Their approach makes it very easy to
continue to treat the tolerated group as social freaks-vulnerable to state
intervention for the protection of normal folk."5 7 Furthermore, their approach makes it impossible to manage the increasingly unruly face of the
public manifestation of nonconformity, a public face that refuses to accept

effort was made to soften the popular belief of the vileness of either group.
185. Christie Davies, Religious Boundaries and Sexual Morality, ANN. REV. SOC. SCI. RELIGION,
Fall 1983, at 45, 72 (studying by way of example the increasing persecution of gay men and lesbians
in early Medieval Visigothic Spain, in late Medieval Europe, and by the Latin Crusaders in the Kingdom of Jerusalem). Christie Davies has persuasively argued that the degree of hostility of Christianity
and Christian society toward sexual nonconformity has varied considerably over place and time, largely as a function of the need to maintain or defend religious and ethnic boundaries. Id. at 71; see also
JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN
EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 269-302
(1980) (describing the change in the popular conception of sexual nonconformity from a personal preference to a dangerous anti-social and extremely sinful aberration). RICHARD PLANT, THE PINK TRIANGLE: THE NAZI WAR AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS 22-52 (1986) (detailing the history of gay men and
lesbians in Germany during the first half of the twentieth century).
186. Howard, supra note 177, at 334 (lamenting the worldwide rise of cultural absolutism because
it "forgives cruelty on the grounds that acting in accordance with the customs of one's own group is a
universal moral principle").
187. See Anderson, supra note 179, at 424-27. For an argument that it is necessary and legitimate
to discuss God and the Judeo-Christian tradition in American legal discourse, and to base law-making
on this tradition, see generally David M. Smolin, The Judeo-ChristianTradition and Self-Censorship
in Legal Discourse, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345 (1988).
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its banishment to the dark comers of the private sphere.
Twenty-five years after the birth of the gay rights movement, progress

remains an illusion. Progress is measured by the crumbs that are thrown
out by the modem equivalent of the medieval princes who occasionally,
and for a price, showed a certain degree of self-interested mercy to fashionably despised (and grateful) groups of an earlier day-the Jewish people or Gypsies.'88 This mercy is not structural; it will last until the dominant culture required to make up its mind decides that the people formerly
suppressed and now tolerated in hiding require direct suppression

again.8 9 Toleration based upon the advancement of substantive constitutional values (for instance, antidiscrimination rules) may prove a weak
reed."9 The Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code provide clear
warning of the future, a future that Pat Buchanan may have best described

at the Republican Convention of 1992 when he exclaimed: "There is a
religious war going on in this country. It is a cultural war, as critical to
the kind of nation we shall be as the Cold War itself, but this war is for
the soul of America."''

Mr. Buchanan has discovered that the dust in

188. For an argument that sexual nonconformists ought to rely more heavily on our modem day
princes--the state and federal governments-for protection from the effects of the disgust of dominant
culture, see Eskridge, supra note 58, at 383-85.
189. For a discussion of the growth of indecisiveness within the American Protestant community
about social problems like sexual nonconformity, see MARTIN E. MARTY, PROTESTANTISM IN THE
UNrrED STATES: RIGHTEOuS EMPRE 247-66 (2d ed. 1986). For an attempt to formulate a progressive
Christian (from a Catholic perspective) approach to the "problem" of sex, see RHODES, supra note 19,
at 153-85. Ultimately even progressives wind up with no better solution than the ancient one--"[s]o I
end up, reluctantly, favoring the continued exclusion from the sacraments at least of those who publicly embrace a manner of living inconsistent with chastity or with the indissolubility of marriage." Id.
at 184. The popular press has worried about the instability of social indecisiveness and the resulting
social polarization as well. See, e.g., Michiko Kakutani, Critic'sNotebook; Books that Make a Case
for Shades of Grey, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18. 1993, at Cl; Kenneth L. Woodward, Losing Our Moral Umbrella: PoliticiansAppeal to a Judeo-ChristianTradition, But Religious Scholars Say It No Longer
Exists, NEwSWEEK, Dec. 7, 1992, at 60.
190. Consider the troublesome nature of the balancing of religious liberties (at the margin) and the
right to a public existence, where, for instance, gay student organizations seek official recognition from
a Catholic University. See Linda J. Lacey, Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University: Constitutional Values on a Collision Course, 64 OR. L. REv. 409, 448-54 (1986). Consider also cases like
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), where the court permitted a landlord to refuse to rent
to an unmarried heterosexual couple on the basis of the landlord's religious views. The court determined that it must balance the religious sensibilities of the landlord against the right of the plaintiffs to
cohabitate without the benefit of marriage. Id. at 8-9. The problem with balancing, of course, is that
you have to trust
the person doing the balancing, and it presumes that even fundamental concepts,
such as personal identity, can be sacrificed. In this assessment, I am more pessimistic than Professor
Eskridge, who correctly, I believe, places little hope in the traditional Libertarian ideal (at least to the
extent that it is represented by codices such as the Model Penal Code), but who places a substantially
greater hope in the power of governmental institutions to turn cultural norms around. See Dalton,
supra note 25, at 909-12; Eskridge, supra note 58, at 381-86.
191. Pat Buchanan, Address at the Republican Party National Convention, Houston, Texas (Aug.
17, 1992), availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNN file.
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his house creates a nausea too great to bear. He and those like him are
prepared to sweep it away again. He is convinced that the dust will kill
him. Liberal toleration indulges also in nausea and disgust, shielding only
that which remains hidden-"Don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue."'92 Prepare.

192. I refer here again to that peculiar child of the liberal toleration promoted by the Model Penal
Code-President Clinton's compromise formula for the toleration of sexual nonconformists in the
military. See Krauss, supra note 45, at A-15.
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